Democrats and Republicans are deeply divided on women’s and girls’ reproductive rights. Abortion laws will play an important role in the 2024 US election. This is not only a domestic policy issue but has international implications, as the watered-down 2019 UN resolution on helping survivors of war-related sexual violence shows.
As threats and attacks against women and LGBTQI* communities continue to rise globally, what are the consequences for states implementing feminist foreign policies and for approaches to peacebuilding?
Luisa Kern is a Mercator Fellow at the United Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR) working on youth, peace and security.
Adopting an intergenerational, intersectional and postcolonial approach to peacebuilding is key in order to meet the current security challenges and protracted conflicts head-on. Combining the efforts of the Women as well as the Youth, Peace and Security Agendas (WPS and YPS) and utilizing their synergies would be a progressive way to future proof against the gender backlash on both sides of the Atlantic. This may be especially crucial in the event of a more isolationist United States and decreasing financial and non-material contributions to the United Nations and the multilateral system as a whole as well as an increasingly militarized security environment.
1. Peacebuilding in the context of a backlash against gender equality
We are currently witnessing a strong backlash against gender equality and diversity (and the mere term of gender) across the globe (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2024). It is a prominent topic in the current US election campaigns, most visible in discussions around limiting the reproductive rights of women and in the weaponization of gender-affirming care. It shows up in the ongoing criminalisation of LGBTQI+ communities (such as Uganda’s 2023 anti-LGBTQ bill (The Republic of Uganda 2023)), the rollback of feminist (foreign) policies (such as in Sweden in 2022) and laws protecting women or gender minorities (e.g. this year’s attempt to repeal the ban on female genital mutilation in The Gambia). This backlash, which often accompanies rising nationalism, authoritarianism and democratic backsliding, also affects gendered and feminist norms or approaches to peacebuilding, and Women and LGBTQI+ Human Rights Defenders, (feminist) peacebuilders and other allies face constant attack.
Throughout the past years, it has become clearer that adopting a gendered, inclusive and intersectional approach to peacebuilding and conflict resolution is crucial. Within that context, the Women and later the Youth, Peace and Security Agendas were agreed upon or further developed. Both argue that increasing the meaningful participation as well as ensuring the protection of previously excluded and marginalized groups such as women and youth and recognizing their ability as peacebuilders is key to better conflict resolution and more peaceful societies. In fact, the WPS agenda, established by UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 (and developed in subsequent resolutions), laid the groundwork for the YPS agenda, established by UNSCR 2250 in 2015 (United Nations Security Council 2000, United Nations Security Council 2015). Despite progress, there continues to be a lack of funding and engagement with these agendas and their supporters, even as they will soon celebrate their 25th and 10th anniversaries, respectively. This rings especially true for the inclusion of young people in peacebuilding, despite the disproportionate impact conflict has upon them. They also face structural barriers to their participation, such as pervasive stereotypes, a lack of financial resources, political buy-in and willingness to consider youth as legitimate political actors, as well as a tendency to see youth as a monolithic group. This is further exacerbated for youth who are discriminated based on their gender, sexual orientation, ethnic or religious identity or disability, which highlights the need to take these overlapping and intersecting identities (or identity markers) into account and adopt an intersectional approach. WPS and YPS efforts do not yet figure into any transatlantic agendas and while regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) have shown great YPS leadership with a Youth Ambassador for Peace program and a Continental Framework on YPS, the EU, for instance, is lagging behind. So far, only four countries have National Action Plans on YPS, with Finland as the only Euro-Atlantic country.
This policy brief argues that combining the efforts of WPS and YPS actors and joining the forces of the two agendas, thereby harnessing specific powers, can help withstand or counter the current anti-gender backlash and address the rise in sexual- and gender-based and anti-LGTBQ+ violence and the general shrinking of civic space for women, youth and other groups. While WPS has higher political buy-in and is more advanced in regard to its progress on institutionalization and implementation (with a much higher number of National Action Plans), YPS has flexibility and considerable mobilization and collective action power. Nevertheless, YPS and WPS actors have so far often chosen siloed approaches, both due to the scarcity of resources and attention, but also due to the lack of a proven track record working together. This is also due to a well-founded worry of “lumping” youth and women together and not considering their specific or distinct needs, which the Independent Progress Study on YPS as well as experts such as Helen Berents point out (Simpson 2018).
Both frameworks, however, are crucial for fostering inclusive and effective peacebuilding efforts and offer roadmaps for more meaningful inclusion and for the protection of the most marginalised groups. Amplifying efforts to address gendered and generational dimensions of conflict necessitates using the synergies of both agendas. Collaborative strategies between YPS and WPS can lead to more holistic solutions, recognize and address intersecting challenges and overlapping layers of vulnerability, enhance the effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives and benefit from young people’s and women’s unique perspectives. They can further optimize resource allocation by avoiding the duplication of efforts and ensuring that investments in peacebuilding are more strategically targeted.
2. Intergenerational and intersectional approaches to peacebuilding and the US elections
The impact that a more or less supportive international environment and especially (less than) favourable next US administration could have on peacebuilding efforts is significant. The WPS and especially the YPS agenda remain underfunded and given the already existing UN liquidity crisis, this situation risks becoming even worse and making synergies harder. Former President Trump has repeatedly criticised the United Nations, and in a second Trump term scenario, a drastic cut in American contributions is highly likely, especially in areas deemed as unimportant or with little return on investment according to his or his team’s views (Klingebiel and Baumann 2024). Moreover, his more “hard security”-focused approach will leave little room for WPS or YPS considerations, with youth only targeted in the context of Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE) approaches, adding to their stigmatization and ongoing securitization. Given Trump and the GOP’s position on abortion and reproductive healthcare, the UN Population Fund (UN-FPA) will see their US funding (completely) cut or withdrawn, as occurred during Trump’s previous term in office (Klingenbiel and Baumann 2024). In addition to offering family planning services (and working on infant and maternal health), UNFPA is however also one of the key actors of youth and women in peacebuilding and humanitarian action and has been involved in many key YPS developments, both in regard to policy and programming. For instance, there are currently numerous developments underway regarding YPS National Action Plans, especially in the West African region, supported by UNFPA and other UN actors. Curtailing this work would significantly hamper youth inclusion given the current lack of WPS and YPS champions. A new Trump presidency may also impede further progress on WPS or YPS resolutions or institutionalization, given the precedent of his first administration’s resistance and threatened veto to UNSCR 2467, a WPS resolution, due to language pertaining to sexual and reproductive health (United Nations Security Council 2019).
While a Harris administration is not likely to further cut contributions to the multilateral system and may even be more attentive to progressive peacebuilding, WPS and YPS will still probably not figure high on their agenda, despite a dire need. In fact, in one possible scenario, despite, or rather because of, the symbolism of a President Harris being the first woman elected US president, she would face even more public scrutiny for pursuing openly feminist or even human-centred security approaches in a generally conservative security environment, curtailing her administration’s focus on these issues.
3. Policy recommendations:
The following policy recommendations are relevant in both election outcome cases, with some caveats.
This policy brief outlined the synergies between YPS and WPS, presented the rationale for their combined focus and provided recommendations for policy integration. Both agendas underscore the importance of inclusive approaches to peacebuilding and the need to integrate marginalized groups into decision-making processes. Through the adoption of an intersectional and intergenerational approach to peacebuilding, transatlantic policymakers could help find tangible resolutions to current protracted conflicts.
Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
References
Klingebiel, S. and Baumann M. (2024): Trump 2.0 in Times of Political Upheaval?, IDOS, www.idos-research.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/publikationen/Policy_Brief/2024/PB_24.2024.pdf (ac-cessed on October 24, 2024).
Simpson, Graeme (2018): The missing peace: Independent progress study on youth, peace and security.
The Republic of Uganda (2023): The Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2023, www.parliament.go.ug/sites/default/files/The%20Anti-Homosexuality%20Act%2C%202023.pdf (accessed on October 24, 2024).
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2024): Gender equality and gender backlash, ohchr.org, www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Women/WG/Gender-equality-and-gender-backlash.pdf (accessed on September 12, 2024).
United Nations Security Council (2000): Resolution 1325 (2000) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000, United Nations Digital Library, digitallibrary.un.org/record/426075 (accessed on October 24, 2024).
United Nations Security Council (2015): Resolution 2250 (2015) / adopted by the Security Council at its 7573rd meeting, on 9 December 2015, United Nations Digital Library, digitallibrary.un.org/record/814032 (accessed on October 24, 2024).
United Nations Security Council (2019): Resolution 2467 (2019) / adopted by the Security Council at its 8514th meeting, on 23 April 2019, United Nations Digital Library, digitallibrary.un.org/record/3800938 (accessed on October 24, 2024).
Ines Meyer holds an M.Sc. in Peace and Conflict from University College Dublin and a B.A. in International Relations and International Organization from the University of Groningen.
The outcome of the 2024 US presidential election will profoundly impact global strategies to prevent and prosecute conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV). A Harris administration can be expected to focus on legal prosecution of perpetrators and continuing US support for multilateral efforts addressing CRSV. In this case, European policymakers should use the momentum to promote the UN and the ICC as core institutions to prevent and prosecute CRSV, adopting a survivor-centred and intersectional approach. Conversely, a Trump administration may impede CRSV policies, particularly concerning sexual and reproductive health. In this scenario, European policymakers should identify areas for joint action and form core groups on issues likely to face US vetoes.
Introduction
Gender has become a key fault line in the 2024 US presidential campaign, with significant consequences not only for the outcome of the election, but also for global efforts to address gender-based crimes in conflict-affected areas. Recent conflicts, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Hamas attacks on 7 October 2023, have once more made visible the pervasive use of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) as a strategy of war. If left unaddressed, CRSV can lead to an escalation of violence, exacerbate conflicts, undermine peace efforts and inflict long-lasting trauma on harmed individuals and communities.
The US presidential election will impact strategies to prevent and respond to CRSV, as the government’s position on sexual and reproductive health (SRH) tends to shift with the party in power – generally supported by Democrats and opposed by Republicans. Given the US’s political and financial influence in key international institutions, European policymakers should prepare distinct policies to fill the gap potentially left by the US. This policy brief explores future scenarios on how the US election will shape global efforts to address CRSV and provide policy recommendations for its prevention and prosecution.
Global efforts to prosecute CRSV
The 1998 Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC), first recognised CRSV and granted the ICC jurisdiction over serious gender-based crimes. The Statute defines crimes like rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and other forms of sexual violence as crimes against humanity and war crimes in both international and non-international conflicts. While women and girls are disproportionately affected, men, boys and LGBTQIA+ individuals are also targeted, with many cases going unreported due to fears of reprisal, stigma and limited access to justice.
CRSV may be used as a war strategy to humiliate and dehumanise populations or as a practice tolerated by armed groups without sanction. During the Russian-Ukrainian war, Pramila Patten, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, stated that CRSV was being used as a military strategy and cited reports of Russian soldiers being supplied with Viagra (Wang et al. 2022). However, CRSV is not an inevitable outcome of conflict; it can be prevented (Wood 2012).
CRSV is increasingly prosecuted in international and domestic courts. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was the first to recognise CRSV as a war strategy and its use against men. The ICC has prosecuted cases involving forced pregnancy and marriage (for instance, in the Ongwen Case). Additionally, some European countries have used command responsibility to hold perpetrators accountable, such as in Germany’s conviction of the Syrian colonel Anwar Raslan for crimes against humanity, including rape. Yet, children born from CRSV are often overlooked in legal processes and seen as “evidence of atrocities” rather than victims in their own right (Mionki 2024).
Scenarios for CRSV policies after the US election
The 2024 US presidential election will significantly impact global efforts to combat CRSV. Harris, a former prosecutor, can be expected to continue Biden-era policies, emphasising prosecution and multilateral action. Trump, who has questioned the ICC’s legitimacy, is expected to block survivor-centred CRSV policies.
What if Harris wins? Momentum for CRSV prosecution
If Harris wins, her administration is expected to prioritise prosecuting perpetrators through unilateral sanctions and support multilateral efforts to address CRSV. The Biden-Harris administration has made significant progress in addressing these crimes. The US Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally explicitly rejects CRSV as an “inevitable by-product of war” and affirms that prevention is fundamental to peacebuilding (US Department of State 2022, p. 28).
Key policy actions include President Biden’s 2022 Presidential Memorandum on Promoting Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, which authorises US agencies to use sanctions, visa restrictions and diplomatic measures to hold perpetrators accountable. This is the first time the US has imposed sanctions based on CRSV. Harris also launched the Dignity in Documentation Initiative, which supports UN efforts to end CRSV and promotes women’s leadership (White House 2024a). Additionally, the US, EU and UK established the Atrocities Crimes Advisory Group (ACA) to assist Ukraine in prosecuting atrocity crimes. To be effective, these initiatives should become systematic and institutionalised, ensuring consistent support, coordination and progress beyond immediate crises.
However, the Democratic Party faces internal divisions regarding CRSV. Some House Democrats withdrew their support for a resolution condemning sexual violence in conflict, fearing that it equated sexual violence by Hamas with that committed by Israeli forces against Palestinians (Giorno 2024). This case raises concerns that a Harris administration may selectively prosecute CRSV based on political alliances. While Harris has condemned sexual violence by Hamas, she has remained silent on sexual violence against Palestinians (White House 2024b).
A Harris administration would thus be expected to prioritise the prosecution of perpetrators through the Presidential Memorandum and the Dignity in Documentation Initiative and by providing funding for multilateral initiatives such as the UN Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, the ACA and international tribunals. However, policies may be conflict-specific.
What if Trump returns? A backlash against CRSV policies
If Trump wins, his administration is expected to block or weaken comprehensive policies and initiatives addressing CRSV, particularly with regard to SRH. However, specific policies will depend on personnel decisions and the influence of particular advisors at any given time. During his first term, Trump led an alliance that blocked UN Security Council Resolution 2467 (2019) from including references to SRH, reflecting a hard-line stance against abortion and limiting the rights of CRSV survivors. CRSV policies that address safe and timely abortion, emergency contraception, obstetric violence and the rights of children born of CRSV are integral to survivor-centred approaches.
Under Trump, US relations with the ICC deteriorated when he imposed sanctions on ICC officials in 2020 after they opened an investigation into US war crimes in Afghanistan. President Biden lifted these sanctions in 2021 and ordered the US government to share evidence of Russian atrocities in Ukraine with the ICC for the first time, marking a major shift in US policy (Savage 2023). A Trump administration is expected to reverse this policy.
While Trump has not explicitly opposed abortion in this year’s election campaign, he appointed anti-abortion justices in his first term. This stance is in line with Project 2025, which calls on the next conservative administration to remove terms such as “gender equality”, “abortion” and “reproductive rights” and claims that USAID is using SRH and intersectionality to promote “woke extremism” (Dans and Groves, 2023, p. 8; 259).
It follows that a Trump administration can be expected to block and reverse US policies to prosecute CRSV, such as revoking the Presidential Memorandum and disbanding the Dignity in Documentation initiative. Multilateral action will also be curtailed through US vetoes or reduced financial support.
Recommendations
If Harris wins, policymakers should adopt a multilateral approach, promoting the UN and ICC as key institutions for CRSV policies and prosecution.
1. Broaden mandates of existing initiatives and secure funding
Policymakers should institutionalise and expand the mandates of existing CRSV initiatives to cover multiple conflict zones. For example, the ACA initiative should be broadened to assist prosecutions in conflict-affected areas beyond Ukraine. Legal assistance should not only be provided to prosecutors but also to individuals seeking legal aid. To ensure long-term planning and large-scale prosecutions, secure and increased funding is needed, particularly for EU institutions coordinating these efforts, such as the European External Action Service. A good example of targeted funding is the UN Action’s multi-partner trust fund, allowing for thematically delineated contributions for member states.
2. Adopt resolutions and promote the ICC as a key institution
Policymakers should advance the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda by fully integrating CRSV into all stages of peacebuilding. Another UN Security Council Resolution should be adopted that contains a survivor-centred approach to CRSV, including SRH, and recognises children born of CRSV as a special category of victimhood. This would expand the scope of CRSV beyond immediate violence and secure funding for SRH care. Additionally, the ICC should be promoted as the key institution for prosecuting gender-based crimes. While it would be desirable for the US to join the ICC, policymakers could push for increased funding by European member states and set up national tribunals with US technical expertise and funding (for instance, for Ukraine). Though costly, permanent tribunals increase accountability and raise the perceived cost of committing these crimes.
3. Conduct transparent and inclusive evaluations
Policymakers should conduct transparent and inclusive evaluations of initiatives addressing CRSV to identify effective strategies and lessons learned. These evaluations should involve key stakeholders, including prosecutors, trauma experts, peacebuilders, civil society organisations and government officials. Jointly synthesising the findings can help deter CRSV and improve efforts to anticipate and prevent it. The results should be made publicly accessible, covering national and multilateral initiatives.
If Trump wins, policymakers should adopt a cohesive European approach to address CRSV and form core coalitions on issues opposed by a Republican administration.
1. Use existing frameworks to call for CRSV action
Policymakers should leverage existing resolutions and guidelines to urge states to fulfil their obligations to prosecute CRSV. For SRH, they can refer to UN Security Council Resolution 2106 (2013), which calls for non-discriminatory, comprehensive healthcare for survivors. Key documents for guiding state action on CRSV include the UN Framework for the Prevention of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Murad Code, both of which promote ethical, survivor-centred investigations. To adopt an intersectional approach, policymakers can use the UN’s Intersectionality Resource Guide and Toolkit.
2. Develop a cohesive EU approach to CRSV
Given the uncertainty of Republican policies, policymakers should adopt a unified European approach vis-à-vis an incoming Trump administration. The EU should formulate a clear strategy for CRSV prevention and prosecution that goes beyond providing funding to external initiatives. For instance, the EU could denominate an EU Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict, collaborating closely with the corresponding UN Office. This representative would serve as a rapporteur, expert and political advocate for CRSV policies and explore options to prosecute CRSV on an EU level.
3. Form core groups for policies opposed by the Trump administration
European policymakers should engage with key US policymakers to identify areas for collaboration, clarifying where joint action is feasible and which organisations will continue to receive US support. On issues likely to face a US veto, policymakers should form core groups with willing countries. For example, the UK and France have generally supported SRH initiatives. Additionally, countries with feminist foreign policies, such as Germany and Spain, could advocate for an intersectional, survivor-centred approach within these core groups, producing reports on best practices, funding mechanisms and capacity building.
Summary
The 2024 US presidential election will significantly shape global efforts to prevent and prosecute CRSV. A Harris administration offers an opportunity for European policymakers to upscale prosecutions and multilateral initiatives focused on holding perpetrators accountable through intersectional and survivor-centred approaches. In contrast, a Trump administration may weaken these efforts, and policymakers should prioritise European initiatives and networks in anticipation of declining US support.
Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
References
Dans, Paul and Groves, Steven (2023): Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise. The Heritage Foundation.
Giorno, Taylor (2024). Israeli Politics Trigger Democrats to Withdraw Support from Sexual Violence Bill in: The Hill, March 28, thehill.com/homenews/house/4560147-israel-politics-trigger-democrats-to-withdraw-support-from-sexual-violence-bill/.
Mionki, Judy (2024): Symposium on Reproductive Violence in International Law: Legal Recognition of Children Born of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence in International Criminal Law, Opinio Juris, opiniojuris.org/2024/06/05/symposium-on-reproductive-violence-in-international-law-legal-recognition-of-children-born-of-conflict-related-sexual-violence-in-international-criminal-law/ (accessed on October 9, 2024).
Savage, Charlie (2023): Biden Orders U.S. to Share Evidence of Russian War Crimes with Hague Court, in: The New York Times, 26 June https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/26/us/politics/biden-russia-war-crimes-hague.html?smtyp=cur&smid=tw-nytimes.
US Department of State (2022): United States Strategy to Prevent and Respond to Gender-Based Violence Globally, www.state.gov/reports/united-states-strategy-to-prevent-and-respond-to-gender-based-violence-globally-2022/ (accessed on September 7, 2024).
Wang, Philip, Tim Lister, Jost Pennington, and Heather Chen (2022): Russia Using Rape as ‘Military Strategy’ in Ukraine: UN Envoy, CNN, edition.cnn.com/2022/10/15/europe/russia-ukraine-rape-sexual-violence-military-intl-hnk/index.html (accessed on October 9, 2024).
White House (2024a): Fact Sheet: The Biden-Harris Administration’s Actions to Address Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/17/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-actions-to-address-conflict-related-sexual-violence/ (accessed on September 8, 2024).
White House (2024b): Remarks by President Harris on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/06/17/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-conflict-related-sexual-violence/ (accessed on October 9, 2024).
Wood, Elisabeth J. (2012): Rape During War is Not Inevitable: Variation in Wartime Sexual Violence, 389-420, in: Bergsmo, M., Skre, A. B., & Wood, E. J. (Eds.). Understanding and Proving International Sex Crimes, Beijing: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher.
Matthias Rétel is a Research Assistant for the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP).
Traditional masculinities must be recognised as key factors contributing to violence and conflict. The gender analysis in the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda should be expanded to incorporate a nuanced understanding of masculinity. There are opportunities to include masculinities into the political debate, such as including masculinity in the UN’s Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda, positioning youth as agents of change to disrupt cycles of violent masculinity and promoting positive role models.
The integration of masculinities within the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda is a critical yet underexplored aspect of peacebuilding. This is symbolically highlighted in the few references to men and boys in the ten resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in the context of the WPS agenda. Critics argue that, while the fact that men and boys can be victims of sexual violence is not mentioned enough in UNSC resolutions, there is also a lack of recognition of masculinity as a conveyor of violence. Hence, integrating masculinities into the WPS means examining how certain forms of masculinities relate to violence and can be harmful to peacebuilding processes. As for the US’s 2023 WPS Strategy and National Action Plan, the only three mentions of men and boys promote their potential positive contributions to peace and security. The next US administration has the opportunity to either engage in tackling harmful masculinities or reinforce militarised masculinity. Therefore, the general elections are crucial for addressing masculinities in a world experiencing a rise in violence.
Times of war and conflict are usually accompanied by a resurgence of traditional masculinity, which generally leads to the militarisation of masculinities and poses significant challenges to peacebuilding efforts. For instance, Ukraine enforced a conscription law and banned adult men from leaving the country. The United States, which has been called “a leading exporter of white supremacist terrorism” (Hoffman and Ware 2023), is also witnessing a resurgence of traditional masculinity within far-right ideologies, evident through the Capitol attack led mostly by male figures. The militarisation of masculinities and its intertwining of domestic and international space also plays out in the domain of foreign policy. In Afghanistan, for example, gender norms and expectations have been profoundly shaped by decades of war and foreign intervention, leading to the reinforcement of rigid gender norms (Myrttinen 2018). Ultimately, the US’s military power, alongside its role as a permanent member of the UNSC, underscores the necessity of reevaluating the US approach to masculinities with a feminist approach.
Demilitarising masculinities is all the more critical given that Democrats and Republicans are divided at their core on gender-related issues, such as reproductive rights. Although they might not explicitly address masculinity, each party’s political orientation towards women’s rights reflects their stance on masculinity. This policy brief adopts a radical feminist perspective and outlines plausible scenarios for how the next US administration could approach masculinities in formulating its (foreign) policies and how this would impact peacebuilding efforts. It then makes recommendations accordingly. The next US administration's approach to these issues may either uphold or challenge established gender norms. On one side, there the potential for the US to follow the UK’s WPS National Action Plan steps, which explicitly recognises masculinity as contributing to insecurity, thus offering a positive direction for peacebuilding. Conversely, neglecting to acknowledge masculinity’s link to violence, alongside the absence of frameworks that embrace intersectional identities—like LGBTQ+ men and men from the Global South—poses serious risks for global peace and security.
Plausible scenarios: Masculinities after the 2024 election on the WPS agenda
Both candidates have released a WPS national action plan during their terms. The 2019 action plan was published under Trump’s presidency, and the 2023 version came under Biden’s presidency while Harris was vice president. To make the scenarios more evidence-based, I will briefly summarise the two WPS national action plans, assuming that the next president’s policy toward masculinities will resemble the ones they have already implemented.
Scenario 1: Trump wins the 2024 election
If Donald Trump wins the 2024 US presidential election, the policy of minimal engagement with masculinities within the WPS agenda seen during his first administration will continue. The 2019 WPS Strategy published during his presidency emphasises women’s leadership in peacebuilding but only briefly mentions men and boys, focusing primarily on their positive contributions without addressing harmful masculinity norms. This lack of attention paid to masculinities reflects a broader disinterest in gender-sensitive policies under Trump’s leadership.
Hence, a likely scenario for a second Trump administration is that it will prioritise military strength and traditional security approaches and exclude progressive gender policies. Trump's penchant for misogyny and homophobia, hypermasculinity ideals—strength, dominance and control—will be further entrenched in policy, reflecting the Trump administration’s focus on hard power. Therefore, programs tackling the role of masculinities in perpetuating violence will continue to be overlooked, which will undermine comprehensive peacebuilding efforts that seek to transform harmful masculinities.
Additionally, Trump’s nationalistic and isolationist tendencies will lead to a diminished role for the US in promoting global gender equality, including within the WPS framework. His administration will certainly also disregard intersectional gender concerns, such as the roles of LGBTQ+ men and men from marginalised racial groups in peacebuilding efforts.
Recommendation
Under a Trump administration, US policymakers may need to work discreetly, perhaps focusing on internal working documents that are not publicly accessible and are less likely to attract attention from the administration. Keeping discussions on masculinities low-key while waiting for a more favourable political climate could help preserve the issue for future administrations that are more open to engaging with gender dynamics. Civil society organisations should focus on maintaining resilience in the face of expected funding cuts.
Given the expected reduction in US federal support, finding creative ways to engage with existing frameworks will be necessary. One possible approach is to address masculinity through alternative agendas, such as the UN’s Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) agenda. As Kern’s policy brief (Kern 2024) argues, combining the WPS and YPS agendas can offer more holistic solutions. Building on this idea, addressing traditional masculinities as drivers of violence within the YPS agenda could be strategic. It can include promoting alternative forms of masculinity, particularly among young people, and positioning them as agents of change to break the cycle of violent masculine socialisation. It can also be part of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. Furthermore, addressing masculinities in the YPS context can help to counter the stigma that portrays young non-white men as inherently dangerous.
Scenario 2: Harris wins the 2024 election
If Kamala Harris wins the 2024 US presidential election, the WPS agenda will build on the progressive, intersectional approach seen under the Biden-Harris administration. Although the 2023 WPS Strategy does not address masculinity as contributing to insecurity, it emphasises engaging men and boys to address harmful social norms, and this approach will be expanded under a Harris administration.
Thus, a scenario for a Harris administration is that it will prioritise a transformative approach to gender relations in conflict and peacebuilding, addressing the complex roles of masculinities in both perpetuating and resolving violence. Programs aimed at transforming harmful masculinities will be strengthened, particularly focusing on the intersection of militarised masculinities and their impacts on both domestic violence and international conflict, as this was already one objective of the 2023 WPS National Action Plan. Harris’s administration will probably push for policies that engage men as partners in peace and gender equality, focusing on the desecuritization of masculinities as part of broader peacebuilding efforts.
Furthermore, Harris will support more inclusive policies that consider the roles of LGBTQ+ men and men from marginalised racial backgrounds in peace processes. Drawing from previous work, such as LGBTQ+ sensitivity training for police officers and prosecutors from African countries, her administration could advocate for US foreign policies that incorporate how specific visions of masculinities can contribute to violence and fuel conflict. However, even though Harris worked as a prosecutor of sexual violence, she has never adopted a radical feminist stance, nor has the majority of the Democratic Party that will comprise her administration. Hence, Harris’s national action plan will not go as far as the UK’s by explicitly presenting masculinity as a conveyor of violence that can undermine peacebuilding.
Recommendation
While a Harris administration may be more open to addressing issues of masculinity, it remains part of the broader patriarchal system in the US. The challenge is then to seize the opportunity provided by a Democratic administration’s progressive stance on gender issues to achieve concrete progress on masculinity-related policies, even though tackling harmful masculinities is somewhat controversial within the Democrat party.
Civil society and policymakers should aim to advocate for a "Masculinity and Peace" agenda. Although such an agenda may seem unrealistic in the immediate term, initiating these discussions could yield long-term results, even if they do not materialise under a Harris presidency. Another inconceivable yet impactful possibility would be pushing for a UN resolution that addresses masculinity within peacebuilding efforts. It would require significant coordination among international policymakers and, while challenging, could provide a lasting platform for action on masculinities.
More realistically, policymakers should expand the gender analysis in the WPS to include a comprehensive gender-relational framework that explicitly includes masculinities. This approach would highlight how militarised masculinity drives violence and marginalises both men and women in conflict zones. This framework incorporates insights from the study on Somalia, showing how unachievable masculine ideals contribute to instability (El-Bushra and Gardner 2016). It can also acknowledge and address how societal expectations of men contribute to both conflict and peace.
In addition, Harris’s involvement in efforts to prevent conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), as highlighted in Meyer’s policy brief (Meyer 2024), could be a practical entry point. Since harmful masculinities are often at the root of violence, including CRSV, addressing masculinities could become a vital element of the next “US strategy to prevent and respond to gender-based violence globally”. It could involve promoting caring masculinities within peacebuilding, hence fostering more compassionate forms of male leadership in conflict resolution.
Conclusion
Incorporating masculinities into the WPS agenda and expanding inclusive peacebuilding programs are essential for addressing the root causes of violence and fostering sustainable peace. Policymakers can build more inclusive and effective peace efforts by broadening the gender-relational framework to account for masculinities and engaging all men, including those from marginalised communities, as active agents of change. Without these critical changes, global peace initiatives will continue to overlook the powerful role gender dynamics play in both perpetuating and resolving conflict.
Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
References
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Baldwin, Gretchen and Hynes, Taylor (2022): The Securitization of Gender: A Primer, The International Peace Institute Global Observatory, theglobalobservatory.org/2022/10/the-securitization-of-gender-a-primer/ (accessed on October 22, 2024).
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Hayriye Simay Tunçkılıç is an Advanced Master’s Graduate of the College of Europe in Natolin and works at the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye as a Public Policy Specialist.
The future of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda depends on the outcome of the US elections, with Kamala Harris likely to support international cooperation and WPS principles, in contrast to the previous administration of Donald Trump, which reduced support for gender equality efforts. Effective implementation of the WPS agenda requires coordinated efforts between US agencies, EU institutions, NATO, UN entities and civil society, prioritizing inclusive gender analysis and diversity in women's participation in peacebuilding and security operations. Transatlantic actors must mandate comprehensive gender analysis across all departments and support regional initiatives, such as the WPS centres in Kosovo, Colombia and Indonesia, to foster collaboration and promote the WPS agenda on a global scale.
UN Resolution 1325 & US Action Plans in history explained
In 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS), urging member states to enhance women’s participation in peace processes and protect them from sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). Alongside nine subsequent resolutions, it established a robust framework to promote women's involvement in achieving peace and security. Resolution 1820 (2008) was pivotal in recognizing sexual violence as a weapon of war and a potential war crime (Congressional Research Service 2023). UN Security Council Resolution 1325 highlights key priorities, including increasing women’s participation in peace mechanisms, safeguarding against SGBV, strengthening women’s legal rights and supporting local women-led peace initiatives (United Nations Security Council 2000).
The US played a significant role in advancing WPS, introducing its first National Action Plan in 2011 under the Obama administration, updated in 2016, to align with UNSCR 1325 by promoting women's participation in conflict prevention and access to humanitarian aid (Kinsella 2021).
In 2017, the WPS Act mandated the creation of national strategies to advance the WPS agenda, marking a distinct shift from the global framework. In 2020, the Trump administration released a WPS Strategy, followed by President Biden's 2023 strategy, reaffirming WPS as “a cornerstone of U.S. efforts to prevent conflict” (Congressional Research Service 2023).
US National Action Plans: Trump administration vs. Biden administration
The approach of the Trump administration to the WPS agenda seemed to be one of neglect, characterised by indifference to women’s issues, incompetence in diplomacy and an infatuation with the military. Trump’s drifting away from diplomacy and toward militant rhetoric threatened the critical space for WPS. The lack of diplomatic personnel and policy direction on WPS had a harmful effect. In Trump’s world, protecting women has been the job of strong men (Frey 2017).
Whereas the Trump administration had set out so-called “constructive” objectives within its WPS Strategy for sustaining peace and security, the administration was notorious for undermining the rights of women and girls and LGBTQ+ individuals, especially in multilateral forums. Their actions have been generally in direct conflict with and positioned in contrast to the twisted positions structured within the strategy. Although the language in the WPS Strategy seemed promising at first glance, it came at odds with the actions of the administration (Dennis 2019).
To give a couple of examples, within the Strategy’s Line of Effort 2, it is indicated that the US should be “supporting multilateral efforts, including at the UN, to address violence in conflict, including sexual violence…” And called for equal access to “… medical care and psycho-social support for survivors of violence, exploitation and abuse”. Yet, the Trump administration’s manners and actions at the UN conclusively demonstrated that the administration supported no such thing (Dennis 2019).
Secondly, one of the most disheartening aspects of the WPS Strategy was the lack of inclusive language. Trump’s strategy included no language emphasising the principle of inclusion, for instance of marginalised groups, consisting of those with disabilities, ethnic, racial and religious minorities, indigenous groups and LGBTQ+ individuals. The strategy did not contain any mention of LGBTQ+ people and underpinned a strict gender binary (Dennis 2019).
The strategy also consisted of many references to rights. However, the Trump administration’s record on human rights, especially on women’s rights, were wretched. One of the administration’s initial actions was to strengthen and vastly expand the Global Gag Rule, restraining the ability of women and girls to practice their right to access sexual and reproductive health care. The Global Gag Rule constrains the ability of organisations to support comprehensive reproductive rights within society (Dennis 2019).
Trump’s 2018 budget proposal for the Department of State and USAID— core entities within the WPS Agenda—proposed to cut 30 per cent of the budget for the State Department and USAID. The budget request was almost completely silent on women. Instead, the priorities were covered with phrases such as “defeating terrorism”, “improving cybersecurity”, and “strengthening economic imperatives” (Frey 2017).
Despite the actions of the Trump administration, the Biden-Harris administration has made historic advances in strengthening the rights and representation of women, and supporting the WPS agenda. WPS is also the main priority within the US National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, enshrining the improvement of gender equity and equality as a strategic imperative within US domestic and foreign policy (The White House 2023).
For instance, in March 2021, the Biden administration publicly announced the formation of the first ever White House Gender Policy Council that focuses on advancing gender equity and equality through collaborating with civil society, governmental agencies and the White House to present policy recommendations and program support on gender-related matters. In October 2021, the administration published another first – a new national gender strategy drafted by the Council, explicitly indicating it would develop an intersectional approach to comprehending gender issues, containing economic security, climate change and gender-based violence (Kinsella 2019).
In 2022, the United States announced an additional $400,000 for the Office of the UN Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG) on Sexual Violence in Conflict, backing efforts to promote justice and accountability and get to the root causes of conflict-related sexual violence. Through the Women, Peace and Security Incentive Fund, USAID has supported the implementation of the WPS Strategy by investing in programs that support women's participation in peacebuilding and decision-making, increasing access to justice for GBV survivors (The American Presidency Project 2024).
The Biden-Harris administration has taken a comprehensive approach to enhance women’s participation, protection and leadership across various sectors. In the military, the administration has prioritised women’s safety and inclusion, implemented historic justice reforms and expanded support for survivors of gender-based violence as recommended by the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault in the Military. The Department of Homeland Security’s Women in Law Enforcement Mentoring Program offers mentorship and career guidance to women in federal agencies (The White House 2023).
To strengthen women’s roles in conflict prevention and resolution, USAID’s WPS Incentive Fund invests in leadership development to break cycles of violence, counter extremism and build peace. Since 2017, the fund has provided over $70 million to 17 countries, including $6.5 million in 2022 for countries like Haiti, Burundi and Libya. The administration has also advanced women’s civic and political leadership through initiatives launched at the Summits for Democracy. The USAID-led program targets barriers to women’s participation in politics, peacebuilding and transitional processes, with $15 million invested in countries like Nigeria, Tanzania and Yemen. Additionally, the Transform Digital Spaces Initiative addresses technology-facilitated violence against women in politics, with a $6 million investment aimed at fostering safer digital environments (The White House 2023).
The institutionalisation of WPS principles is central to the administration’s strategy. The Department of Defence has established a Gender Advisor workforce to integrate gender considerations across its operations. The administration also incorporates WPS principles within the Global Fragility Act implementation, focusing on gender-responsive strategies in partner countries to build sustainable peace and prevent conflicts. Addressing the gendered impacts of climate change is another priority. The US government has launched initiatives to elevate women as leaders in climate adaptation, response and policymaking. Programs like the US Strategy to Respond to the Effects of Climate Change on Women ensure that gender-sensitive approaches are embedded in environmental justice efforts (The White House 2023).
In its promotion of global partnerships, the US co-chaired the UN Women WPS-Focal Points Network in 2023 with Romania. The partnership brought together representatives from various countries to discuss strategies for strengthening WPS initiatives and bridging the gap between policy and practice. The administration also launched international initiatives to combat online harassment and technology-facilitated gender-based violence, prioritizing the protection of women leaders, journalists and activists (The White House 2023).
The future of equal peacekeeping: Trump vs. Harris
Based on the different perspectives and approaches of the Trump-Pence administration and Biden-Harris administration, the future of UN Resolution 1325 and the WPS Agenda is in the hands of two candidates: Donald Trump and Kamala Harris.
His contradictory WPS agenda aside, Trump’s discriminatory discourse towards women and marginalised groups will most likely make his second term threatening not only for American women, but it will also adversely affect the future of transatlantic cooperation with the European Union and EU-related institutions.
On the other hand, Kamala Harris may be a hope for continuation on peacekeeping by sustaining WPS and UN Resolution 1325. Harris spent a significant portion of her career as a prosecutor working to protect women and girls from violence. As vice president, she has continued this leadership globally, working to assure that CRSV—and promoting the status of women and girls—remained at the forefront of her national security policymaking (The American Presidency Project 2024).
Accordingly, Harris has launched the Dignity in Documentation Initiative, aimed at offering support for survivor and civil society-led efforts to monitor and document CRSV with respect to the Murad Code, named after Nobel Laureate and survivor Nadia Murad. This program, supported with a $10 million investment from the US Department of State, backs justice for survivors through promoting accountability for crimes punishable under international law (The American Presidency Project 2024).
Recommendations
Transatlantic actors, including the US, EU institutions (such as the European Commission, the EEAS and European Parliament), NATO, UN agencies, EU member states and EU-based civil society organizations like the European Women’s Lobby (EWL) and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), must adapt their strategies based on the US election outcome to effectively advance the WPS agenda.
If Kamala Harris wins, transatlantic actors should capitalize on her administration’s alignment with WPS principles. Under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission, along with NATO, should collaborate closely with the US to implement a unified approach to gender analysis, integrating WPS principles into all programming. EU institutions like the EEAS and the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) can coordinate with Harris’s administration to establish transatlantic training programs that empower women in security and peacebuilding. NATO’s partnership with the US can focus on expanding women’s roles in defence operations, while cooperation with the White House Gender Policy Council can align policies with support from organizations such as EWL and the European Network of Migrant Women.
On an international level, with Harris’s backing, NATO, the European Commission and UN entities should collaborate to implement WPS resolutions, ensuring that gender equality is integrated into defence policies and women are involved in decision-making roles. Regional WPS centres in Kosovo, Colombia and Indonesia can be expanded through joint investments, leveraging expertise from both sides of the Atlantic.
If Donald Trump wins, transatlantic actors will need to act more independently. The European Commission, along with NATO and UN agencies, should uphold comprehensive gender analysis without relying on US support. Collaboration with like-minded agencies in the US that remain committed to WPS principles will be crucial. Much can still be done at a working level, without leadership involvement. The EU and NATO must lead efforts to train women for key security roles, engaging civil society organizations such as GAPS to maintain progress. EU member states and institutions should strengthen and fund gender councils to ensure robust WPS strategies.
If the US disengages from the UN under Trump, the European Commission, NATO and UN entities must take a more assertive role, ensuring WPS resolutions are effectively implemented. EU member states should collaborate with international allies like Canada and Norway to diversify funding and continue advancing the WPS agenda, even with diminished US participation.
By adjusting their strategies based on the US election outcome, transatlantic actors can either deepen collaboration with a Harris administration or sustain and expand WPS principles independently if Trump wins, ensuring that global peace and security initiatives remain inclusive and impactful.
References
Blanchfield, Luisa, (2023): Women, Peace, and Security: Global Context and US Policy, Congressional Research Service, crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12346 (accessed on October 8, 2024)
Dennis, Rebecca (2019): Will Trump’s Women, Peace and Security Strategy Actually Advance Women, Peace or Security?, PAI, pai.org/resources/will-trumps-women-peace-and-security-strategy-actually-advance-women-peace-or-security/ (accessed October 6, 2024)
Frey, Barbara (2017, September 27): The Women, Peace and Security Agenda Under the Trump Administration: Undercutting Advances with a Return to Masculine Militarism, University of Minnsota,, genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/the-women-peace-and-security-agenda-under-the-trump-administration-undercutting-advances-with-a-return-to-masculine-militarism/ (accessed on October 8, 2024)
Huve, Sophie (2018): 2018: The Year to Implement the Women, Peace and Security Act, Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/2018-the-year-to-implement-the-women-peace-and-security-act/ (accessed on October 7, 2024)
Kinsella, Caroline. (2021): The US Needs a Revised Strategy on Women, Peace and Security post Trump, securitywomen, www.securitywomen.org/post/the-us-needs-a-revised-strategy-on-women-peace-and-security-post-trump (accessed on October 5, 2024)
The American Presidency Project (2024): FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration's Actions to Address Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administrations-actions-address-conflict-related-sexual (accessed on October 5, 2024)
The White House (2023): FACT SHEET: Release of the 2023 Women, Peace and Security Strategy and National Action Plan, www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/31/fact-sheet-release-of-the-2023-women-peace-and-security-strategy-and-national-action-plan/ (accessed on October 7, 2024)
United Nations Security Council (2000): Resolution 1325 (2000) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000, United Nations Digital Library, digitallibrary.un.org/record/426075 (accessed on October 23, 2024).
Mercatorfellow at the United Nations Centre for Policy Research
Research question: Can an intersectional approach to peacebuilding and joining forces of the WPS and YPS agendas drive forward conflict resolution in the face of persistent crises?
Research question: How could the 2024 U.S. Presidential elections affect global strategies for preventing and prosecuting conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and the implications for states committed to implementing feminist foreign policies?
Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP)
Research question: How would the next US administration approach masculinities in formulating its (foreign) policies, and how would this impact peacebuilding efforts?
College of Europe in Natolin (MA) and the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye (TOBB)
Research question: How does the participation of youth shape the future of US politics and feminist foreign policy around the world in promoting inclusive peacebuilding efforts?
© College of Europe in Natolin
