Text by Maria Skóra
In the last decade, we have observed the rise of illiberal populism. Beyond analysing authoritarian playbooks, it is as important to identify the sources of democratic resilience to mitigate the risks of what some researchers call the third wave of autocratisation.
The illiberal wave
Populists don’t always turn into autocrats. However, once they do, it isn’t easy to contain them. To consolidate their power, they purposely dismantle democratic foundations. In Europe, the most dramatic consequences of the illiberal-populist backlash materialised in Hungary in 2010, when the Fidesz party won parliamentary elections by a landslide. Since then, Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has developed into a hybrid regime of electoral autocracy (Del Río 2022). And Orbán’s copycats – Janez Janša (Slovenian Democratic Party, SDS) in Slovenia and Jarosław Kaczyński (Law and Justice, PiS) in Poland – were similarly successful.
Slovenia experienced a shorter autocratic episode (2020-2022), but during his time as prime minister, Janša publicly discredited civil society, attacked the media and engaged in high-level corruption (Fink-Hafner 2024). In Poland, the United Right coalition led by PiS had two full terms (2015-019 and 2019-2023) to enact the authoritarian playbook. They aggressively pursued judicial reforms and highjacked public broadcasters. Their illiberal agenda also led to shrinking civil spaces and state capture (Sadurski 2018). After parliamentary elections in 2023, a broad opposition alliance managed to form a majority government, but they are still struggling to overcome the legacy of the PiS era.
Wrestling with illiberal populism is a process of two steps forward, one step back: While Slovenia and Poland ousted their autocratic leaders, Robert Fico (Direction – Social Democracy, SMER), an ally of Viktor Orbán (Gizińska & Dębiec 2024), celebrated electoral success in Slovakia. On top of that, with increasing political pressure in the media sector and the ongoing normalisation of the far-right, Greece and Italy have become new causes for concern. The 2024 edition of the Rule of Law Report only confirms these worrisome observations (European Commission 2024). The threat of creeping autocratisation in Europe is real.
Lessons learnt from Hungary and Poland
The examples of Hungary and Poland teach us that democratic subversion often starts with the dismantling of the rule of law. Without checks and balances and an independent judiciary, a power grab in the realms of the media, civil society and political competition becomes easier. This modus operandi eventually led to a collision course with the EU, which triggered sanctions against Hungary and Poland under both Article 7 of the EU treaties and using the rule of law conditionality mechanism. The two countries were often lumped together. Yet today Poland is on course for a democratic resurgence, whereas Hungary continues its drift away from democratic standards. What differentiates the two cases?
First, in 2010, the sweeping electoral victory of Fidesz gave them a two-thirds majority in parliament and absolute power to create the foundations of a new regime, which included passing a new constitution. The PiS party was less lucky, even though in 2015, it acquired both a majority in parliament and the president’s office. Despite PiS’s political takeover of the judiciary, partisan state capture in Poland did not advance as far as in Hungary.
Second, the PiS-led government in Poland was less successful at shrinking civil society and monopolising the media than Orban's regime. Despite being heavily polarised, public debate in Poland was still pluralistic. Although the Polish public service broadcasting fell political loot, in Hungary, 80 per cent of the media market is now controlled by circles close to Fidesz (Reporters Without Borders 2024).
Finally, Poland has a party-list proportional representation electoral system for the lower house of parliament (Sejm), which is more powerful than the upper house (Senat) whose members are elected in single-seat constituencies. Polish opposition was also spread across the country. In Hungary, Fidesz dominated outside Budapest. The Hungarian electoral law for a unicameral legislature (Országgyűlés) is also more complex, with members elected using a system of mixed proportional representation, including a first-past-the-post system. As a result, the Polish opposition, despite unfair campaigning conditions, had a greater chance of winning more seats countrywide. And thanks to unprecedented voter mobilisation, they achieved it (National Electoral Commission 2023). The peaceful transition of power in Poland was the first step towards halting and reversing democratic backsliding.
Building democratic resilience
The spreading practice of subverting democracy not by violence but through autocratic legalism and the growing number of backsliding countries have made democratic decline a burgeoning area of policy analysis and academic research. Nevertheless, the other side of the equation – democratic resilience– shouldn’t be neglected.
The rule of law is the backbone of every democratic system. The institutional framework and legal design based on democratic principles serve as the foundation for the functioning of the state. Nevertheless, laws and institutions are only as strong as the integrity of those in power. The pillars of democracy – organised civil society, independent media and free and fair elections– can slow down or even stop an intentional undermining of the rule of law. They not only act as watchdogs and whistle-blowers, but also as democracy defenders, when need be.
The opposite examples of Poland and Hungary suggest that strengthening democratic resilience must be anchored in society. There are legal pathways to improving checks and balances and the functioning of the rule of law. Policies for promoting democracy are equally important, as they can equip citizens with the sensibility and courage to act when democracy is under threat. Democracies are resilient if their principles are internalised and lived out not only from the top down but also from the bottom up.
Promoting civic education and participation, supporting a pluralistic media landscape and securing electoral integrity demand immediate attention to successfully counter the illiberal wave in Europe and beyond.
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