The second Trump administration is actively precipitating the dissolution of the post-war international order. As alliances dissolve and disorder spreads, strategies of bloc formation and multi-alignment are becoming obsolete. To prevent a descent into a predatory world of imperial politics, the “Rest of the West” and the Global South must join forces to preserve the basic principles of international law and global order.
Before the re-election of Donald Trump, many believed that the world was headed towards growing tension, if not outright conflict, between the Global West and the Global East. The most tangible manifestation of this dynamic was Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, after which followed Western support for Kyiv and less overt but equally significant Chinese economic and technological support for Moscow. North Korean troops fighting alongside Russia and deepened military cooperation between Tehran and Moscow only added further fuel to the fire. While most dismissed the idea of an alliance in the making, it was taken seriously enough that the acronym “CRINK” (standing for China,Russia, Iran and North Korea) began circulating in public debate to indicate the axis of countries at the forefront of the confrontation with the Global West. Many depicted this confrontation not merely in geopolitical, but in normative terms as well. It was a struggle of democracy against autocracy, so the argument went, part of the larger narrative pushed by the Biden administration in particular. A heated debate ensued over what has become known as “the Global South”, a term that refers to a wide diversity of countries varying in size, geography, level of development and political system and orientation. The Global South came to be viewed as the new terrain of competition between the Global West and East. The BRICS grouping of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) gathered steam and enlarged its membership in 2024 and 2025, blowing wind into the sails of the Global East. At the same time, Global South countries became regular guests at G7 summits, setting off debates about possible G7+ formats. Yet, countries in this heterogenous grouping balked at the idea of having to choose between East and West. Those strong and powerful enough to hedge their bets, like India and various Gulf countries, played in both camps at their convenience, seeking to extract maximum gain from all sides. Smaller and weaker countries attempted to extricate themselves from the dilemma, concentrating instead on their domestic and regional agendas. The overall resistance to this binary choice echoed the spirit of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War.
Two competing views
Since Trump‘s re-election, however, this dynamic has been turned on its head. The apparent convergence between the US under President Trump and Russia under President Putin on the war in Ukraine, on the one hand, and the US‘s greater readiness to strike trade deals with China than with long-time partners like the EU, on the other, is catalysing two opposing views amongst policymakers and analysts about the emerging world (dis) order and how to navigate it. One view is that Washington‘s about-faceon Ukraine and willingness to strike deals with China vindicates the strategy of multi-alignment adopted by middle powers in the Global South. It explains why, for instance, the first negotiations between Russia and Ukraine took place in Saudi Arabia and in Turkey rather than in “aligned” countries in Europe or East Asia. Riyadh and Ankara resisted being forced into taking a side, winning themselves the role of honest brokers. Overall, this view suggests countries in the so-called “Power South” can best secure their national interests by hedging, pursuing strategic autonomy, rejecting permanent alliances and engaging in transactional cooperation. I believe the opposite is true. In fact, the shift in US foreign policy under Trump invalidates multi-alignment as a strategy. A country can only be multi-aligned in a world in which multiple alignments and orders still exist. But recent events suggest that alignments may soon be a thing of the past, and that rather than multiple — perhaps even competing — orders, we may be left with mere disorder instead. The Trump administration appears to genuinely believe that the post-war international order built and led by the US since 1945 does not serve American interests. The US not only no longer wants to be the hegemon of that order, but it is intent on smashing it and the alignments that came with it. Oddly, the US is transforming into a revisionist player in the international system. It is even more revisionist than China in some respects, which at least implicitly acknowledges that it has benefited from the postwar multilateral order. Rather than a liberal international order resting on American power, what Washington seems attracted to now looks more like empire – the pursuit of territorial expansion and predatory relationswith former allies and partners, unshackled by international rules, norms and institutions. The Trump administration seems content with the idea that other major powers are also allowed to have their own spheres of influence, so long as the US remains first among imperial equals. Whether or not the US-led liberal international order promoted or hindered US interests is beside the point, as is whether the pursuit of American empire will become a reality or remain a mere aspiration. To the extent that Trump believes the former order did not advance US interests, that order – which was already under threat externally – is unlikely to survive its own creator‘s death blow. The end of that order will also mean the end of alignments altogether, beginning with the most closely-knit alignments in the Global West.
The need for new partnerships
This raises the question of how other countries should react. In particular, where does this leave the “Rest of the West” as well as the “Global Rest”? The Rest of the West is scrambling to regroup, rearm and reduce ist dependencies in sensitive areas. The challenge is massive – materially, but above all psychologically. Europe is on the frontlines of this challenge – squeezed by the Russian threat, the American betrayal and the danger from within posed by far-right forces backed, unsurprisingly, both by Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. But Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Mexico and others aren’t likely to fare much better. At the same time, Trump is having a unifying effect on the Rest of the West, as is shown by the participation of Canada, Japan and South Korea in the “coalition of the willing” preparing to secure any eventual peace deal in Ukraine. There is no doubt that, if they collectively get their act together, the Rest of the West – still comprising some of the world‘s wealthiest nations – would remain a formidable force. However, it would be a major mistake for them to act alone. Rather, they should seek to join forces with countries in the Global South – both the poor and the powerful – who also consider a world of empires, where“might makes right” is the prevailing law, as a serious threat to their interests. The norms of a future world order these countries could aspire to and agree on may not be as “thick”and intrusive as those of the liberal international order. But they should at least adhere to the core principles of the Charter of the United Nations: non-aggression, the prohibition of territorial expansion or border changes by force and respect for sovereignty. In this respect, Europe‘s normative ambiguity with regard to recent Israeli actions, including its attack on Iran – in which Europeans cited Israel‘s right to self-defence, although it attacked a sovereign country in violation of the UN Charter and the Geneva Convention – and its devastating war in Gaza, has represented a major setback to its goal of restoring its credibility in the eyes of the Global South.
“A country can only be multi-aligned in a world in which multiple alignments and orders still exist. But recent events suggest that alignments may soon be a thing of the past.”
Crafting a common agenda
The Rest of the West‘s common agenda with the Global Rest should start with a recommitmentto the fundamentals of international law. But it shouldn‘t stop there – it should go on to explore what parts of the multilateral order can be saved or rebuilt. The EU‘s proposal to Pacific countries of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to work together to salvage the international trading system is precisely the right approach to take. The Global Rest, particularly countries in the Global South, are absolutely right when they criticise the West for double standards and hypocrisy, as well as for having committed or been complicit in large-scale violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. But the current scale of human suffering we are witnessing as the current international order unravels – from Gaza and Ukraine to Lebanon and Sudan – will only be amplified should it be undone entirely. Development, among other areas, will suffer too. Protectionism will only hinder global growth, while public debt burdens will become ever more unsustainable for many low- and middle-income countries. Yes, the old order is broken – perhaps beyond repair – but this is no reason to give up on order altogether. It is up to the Rest of the West to join with the Global Rest to salvage what is worth keeping and rebuild a new order together.
- Nathalie Tocci is director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, professor at the School of Transnational Governance (European University Institute) and chair of the International Advisory Board of the BKHS
