The EU‘s second turning point
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine marked a historic rupture for Europe. Today, the EU faces a second turning point: a historic shift in the global role of the US. This shift had already become apparent during the first Trump administration, and it is now unfolding in full – it is comprised of threats against allies, sympathy for autocrats, the questioning of NATO´s collective solidarity, coercive trade policy, the authoritarian restructuring of American democracy and a retreat from the liberal international order, including the rejection of the very concept of the “democratic West”. Combined with the EU’s lack of agency in foreign, security and defence policy, this has resulted in the major powers giving little consideration for or flat-out ignoring Europe in key questions of security, such as the war in Ukraine or the Middle East conflict (Draghi, 2025). International politics is increasingly being shaped by economic and military hard power and by three revisionist great powers: China, Russia and the US. Each is undermining, to varying degrees, international norms, borders and institutions, thereby destabilising both regional and global orders in the process.
Marginalisation or self-assertion
If Europe is to exert global influence and shape both the European and the international order of the 21st century, if it is to assert itself in international politics, defend its interests and values, and avoid marginalisation, the EU must become a sovereign actor in foreign and security policy. The capacity for an independent and autonomous foreign and security policy is not the only – but a central – prerequisite for sovereignty. As the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have once again demonstrated, economic and diplomatic power depend on credible military capabilities. European leaders and policymakers, therefore, must finally exercise independence and autonomy of thought by conceptualising security and defence in line with Europe’s own priorities and interests. However, autonomy does not eliminate the need for partnerships and alliances; in fact, these remain essential for Europe to achieve its strategic goals and enhance its effectiveness and capacity to act.
Core interests and values
The EU’s priorities in foreign and security policy include safeguarding its fundamental interests: its security, independence and integrity (Art. 21(2) of the Treaty of the European Union). Specifically, the Union is committed to assuming a global role, preserving a rules-based international order and promoting effective multilateralism. EU external action is also bound to democracy, human rights, international law and the Charter of the United Nations (Art. 21(1) TEU). When building long-term partnerships, therefore, the EU must consider normative compatibility and shared values, in addition to mutual benefit and the Union’s own interests. Given the complexity of current dynamics in international politics – as well as Europe’s own history of double standards, its current democratic shortcomings (e.g., populism, unfair financial and economic structures) and the legacy of colonialism – the EU should seek new partnerships in a self-reflective, pragmatic and interest-driven manner. This does not mean Europe should abandon or downplay its values. However, no actor – and certainly not the former colonial powers of Europe, which represent less than six percent of the world’s population – will succeed in imposing its values through pressure or moralising. Today, there are 195 states worldwide, the overwhelming majority of which are not great powers. Revisionism, imperialism and the violent enforcement of national territorial claims are rejected by most of the world’s population.
“Without stability at home, Europe cannot command respect abroad.”
By contrast, a rules-based multilateral order founded on the UN Charter is likely to enjoy broad support if it were to be made more inclusive, fairer and more representative than the current order.
Europe must be more courageous
Today’s challenges and crises are inherently transnational, and regional instability almost always produces global effects. Accordingly, the EU’s two most recent security policy documents – the Strategic Compass (Council of the European Union, 2022) and the White Paper for European Defence (European Commission, 2025) – correctly assign a central role to Europe’s partnerships. The Strategic Compass highlights partnerships as one of the four key pillars for strengthening Europe’s strategic role by 2030. However, to be more successful in its partnership policy and in addressing global challenges, the EU should adopt a bolder, more sovereign and more pragmatic approach to cooperation – one that is guided by strategic (not narrow) interests. This should include upfront, non-reciprocal investments in global public goods, multilateral organisations, regional stability, climate and energy partnerships, and development, as well as the removal of its own protectionist trade barriers. The White Paper on Defence emphasises that international security challenges must be addressed multilaterally and with partners (European Commission, 2025). Enhanced cooperation with reliable partners that already have close ties to the EU through trade, energy, technology and industry is considered essential for innovation, capability development and the resilience of the defence industry. In addition to Europe’s traditional partners and NATO members, the white paper attaches considerable importance to the Indo-Pacific region. Ukraine is given its own separate chapter, underscoring both its centrality for European security and the progress already made in EU-Ukrainian cooperation in security and defence, including its integration into EU armaments programmes such as SAFE (Security Action for Europe). The Commission rightly advocates for a flexible geometry of cooperation, which includes the involvement of partners in defence projects, armaments initiatives and information-sharing practices. What is lacking in both documents are measures to transform EU decision-making structures, either within or initially outside the EU treaties, in an open and inclusive manner. In the area of foreign and security policy, such measures should include the establishment of a European Security Council and a Defence Union – both of which would serve to ensure a coherent foreign policy, a common defence policy, collective procurement and civil-military command structures capable of collective defence and international crisis management. These new structures would act in consultation and coordination with NATO but should also be able to act independently when necessary.
Preconditions for effective partnerships
For Europe’s partnership strategy to succeed, it must first secure the preconditions of its own agency. It must transform strategic autonomy from rhetoric into reality and strengthen its capacity to act independently and credibly across various domains (e.g., military, technological and financial). Within Europe, this requires reformed political structures to enable a genuine common foreign and defence policy as well as investments in a resilient defence industry, critical technologies and shared capabilities. Equally crucial is effective action and engagement in Europe’s neighbourhood—stabilising the Western Balkans, securing its flanks and ensuring Ukraine’s survival and reconstruction. Without stability at home, Europe cannot command respect abroad. Internationally, active diplomacy in multilateral forums, sustainable trade and energy policies, and clear commitments to international law and development will reinforce Europe’s credibility. On this basis, partnerships can help Europe to achieve three important things: extend its influence in the Indo-Pacific, rebalance transatlantic ties away from dependence on the US and deepen cooperation with other world regions, the Global South in particular. At this second critical turning point, the EU is faced with a tough decision – self-marginalisation as a dependent periphery, or self-assertion as a sovereign actor able to defend its interests and values together with partners.
- Dan Krause is programme director for Europe and International Politics at the BKHS.
References
- Council of the European Union (2022) A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence.
- Draghi, M. (2025) Turn skepticism into action. Mario Draghi’s speech at the Meeting. Available at: www.meetingrimini.org en/turn-skepticism-into-action-mariodraghis-speech-at-the-meeting/ (Accessed: 14 October 2025).
- European Commission (2025) White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.
- European Union (2012) Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the European Union.
