



## **Bridging the governance gap in EU Economic Security**

**Recommendations for institutional reform  
at the trade-security nexus**



## Key takeaways

- #1 The EU's economic security governance is not yet adapted to the current geoeconomic environment.** Siloed responsibilities between EU trade policy and largely national security policies hinder strategic coordination, allowing unilateral national actions to generate spillover effects across the integrated Single Market, as illustrated by the Nexperia and Lithuania cases.
- #2 The challenge lies not in the absence of instruments, but in their fragmented and uncoordinated use.** The EU has developed a broad economic security toolbox, yet without a governance framework that systematically brings together Member States and EU actors, these instruments cannot be deployed strategically or coherently.
- #3 Existing reform proposals fail to reconcile ambition with political feasibility.** Incremental approaches risk falling short of addressing structural weaknesses, while more far-reaching institutional redesigns are constrained by political realities and the impracticality of rapid treaty change in a fast-moving geoeconomic context.
- #4 Closing governance gaps requires targeted institutional innovation within existing structures.** Strengthening economic security governance depends on creating dedicated coordination bodies and clear leadership – potentially through a HR/VP for Economic Security – to ensure strategic coherence across trade and security policies without altering the treaties.

## Bridging the governance gap in EU Economic Security

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How can the EU act as a geoeconomic power when its trade policy is decided in Brussels, while security policy remains mostly in the hands of the Member States? In a political context in which the world's major economic powers now routinely deploy economic instruments for geopolitical aims, the EU can only remain competitive if its governance framework is sufficiently flexible to adapt to this reality.

Under increasing geoeconomic pressure, the EU has developed a set of tools that blur traditional boundaries between policy fields. Like other major global actors, it increasingly relies on economic instruments to pursue strategic objectives, including in areas with clear security implications. This includes, for instance, export controls on dual-use goods that can serve both civilian and military purposes, or a framework designed to better coordinate Member States' investment screening mechanisms.

While these instruments are often designed at EU level, their implementation largely remains with the

Member States (see Table). Member States, in turn, bring their own foreign policy strategies to the table, shaped by domestic political considerations but even more so by their specific dependencies on third countries. The result is a wide range of instruments, without a single overarching strategy to guide their deployment and implementation.

These issues have partly been addressed in a recently published communication by the European Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP).<sup>1</sup> The communication includes among policy aspects, also governance recommendations, such as improved coordination among Member States and a stronger role for the European External Action Service (EEAS).

Drawing on interviews with representatives from EU institutions and Member States, this policy brief maps the current governance architecture of European economic security and assesses options for reform.<sup>2</sup>

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1 European Commission & HR/VP (2025): [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0020), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0020>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

2 Six interviews were held (written, in person and online) in August and September 2025. With officials from: the European Commission (Interview 1), the European External Action Service (Interview 2), the Council of the EU (Interview 3), the German Economic Ministry (Interview 4), a former German Minister for Economy (Interview 5), a former State Secretary of German Minister for Economy (Interview 6)

## Introducing the fragmented EU economic security governance structure

Economic security is inherently an interdisciplinary policy field. The critical nexus between trade and security becomes particularly visible in the context of so-called autonomous trade defence instruments. These instruments fall under the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), an area of exclusive EU competence.<sup>3</sup> Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the European Commission initiates legislative proposals, most often led by the Directorate-General for Trade and Economic

Security (DG TRADE). These are subsequently negotiated and adopted by the European Parliament (primarily through the International Trade Committee, INTA) and the Council of the EU (Foreign Affairs Council in its Trade configuration). Autonomous defence instruments are therefore designed and decided at EU level, largely by trade policy actors.

Implementation, however, tells a different story. Beyond the Commission, Member States play a decisive role in determining when and how these instruments are applied (see Table). This decentralised implementation creates significant coordination challenges.

**Table: Implementation of selected autonomous defence instruments**

Instrument	Implementation Process
<b>Anti-coercion instrument (2023)</b>	The Commission proposes response measures; <b>Member States vote</b> through the comitology examination procedure (qualified majority); the European Parliament is informed.
<b>Regulation establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments (2019)</b>	<b>Member States decide</b> whether to approve or block an investment; the Commission may issue opinions in individual cases.
<b>Regulation on export controls for dual-use items (2021)</b>	<b>Member States decide</b> on export authorisations; the Commission may, via delegated acts, determine which items are subject to control. The European Parliament and the Council are informed and retain the right of revocation.
<b>Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market (2022)</b>	The <b>Commission acts</b> as the sole implementing and enforcement authority.

Source: own representation, based on EPRS, Gisela Grieger (2025): [Understanding the EU trade defence toolbox](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/775919/EPRS_BRI(2025)775919_EN.pdf) [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/775919/EPRS\\_BRI\(2025\)775919\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2025/775919/EPRS_BRI(2025)775919_EN.pdf), (accessed 16.02.2026).

3 Article 3(1)(e) TFEU

The strategic deployment of defence instruments requires effective coordination among Member States. Without it, unilateral actions taken at the national level risk undermining the economic security of the EU as a whole.

A recent example is the Nexperia crisis.<sup>4</sup> In September 2025, the Netherlands adopted emergency legislation to take control of the semiconductor manufacturer Nexperia, headquartered in the Netherlands but owned by the Chinese company Wingtech. The move was driven by concerns that Chinese ownership could lead to the relocation of critical technology or production capacity out of Europe. China responded with export restrictions, resulting in severe supply bottlenecks for a wide range of European companies, particularly in the automotive sector. The case illustrates how unilateral national action can generate EU-wide effects in a highly integrated Single Market.

A second example concerns Lithuania, which in 2021 allowed the opening of a “Taiwan Representative Office” and subsequently faced economic coercion from China.<sup>5</sup> China’s trade restrictions on Lithuanian exports and the disruption of supply chains containing Lithuanian inputs had spillover effects on German, French and Swedish companies operating across the single market.<sup>6</sup> In practice, a third country exerted pressure on large parts of the EU internal market through targeted coercive measures against one Member State. As in the Nexperia case, this example underscores that unilateral national decisions, in the absence of a common EU strategy, can have unintended consequences for the entire Single Market.

To prevent such spillover effects, institutional mechanisms are needed to ensure coordination across trade and security policies, consequently between the Member States and the EU level. This need was already recognised with the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which established the European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP). The EEAS’s mandate explicitly tasks it with ensuring the coherence of the EU’s external action.<sup>7</sup> How effectively the EEAS and the HR/VP fulfill this role in the field of economic security, however, remains highly contested.

While the EEAS maintains that it is regularly consulted by the Commission during the implementation of trade defence instruments<sup>8</sup> and the Commission confirms the existence of close “day-to-day cooperation”<sup>9</sup>, the picture looks markedly different from the perspective of Member States. Here, the EEAS is often not perceived as a relevant actor, largely because it is not involved in negotiations at working level.<sup>10</sup> Instead, the effective link runs directly between Member States and the Commission, “this is where the magic happens”.<sup>11</sup>

One frequently cited platform facilitating this link is the Economic Security Network, launched by the Commission in summer 2025 as an informal forum for exchange among Member States. While the network is widely seen as useful for coordinating positions on economic security, it is also described as problematic since it is a vehicle that departs from the formal governance logic foreseen in the Treaties, under which coordination among Member States should primarily take place within the Council of the EU.<sup>12</sup>

4 García-Herrero, A. (2025): [The Nexperia crisis: a wake-up call for Europe’s approach to Chinese investment](https://www.bruegel.org/newsletter/nexperia-crisis-wake-call-europes-approach-chinese-investment), <https://www.bruegel.org/newsletter/nexperia-crisis-wake-call-europes-approach-chinese-investment>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

5 Merics (2021): [Dealing with China’s economic coercion – The case of Lithuania and insights from East Asia and Australia](https://merics.org/de/executive-memo/dealing-chinas-economic-coercion-case-lithuania-and-insights-east-asia-and-australia), <https://merics.org/de/executive-memo/dealing-chinas-economic-coercion-case-lithuania-and-insights-east-asia-and-australia>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

6 Szczepeński, M. (2022): [China’s economic coercion](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/738219/EPRS_BRI%282022%29738219_EN.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com), [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/738219/EPRS\\_BRI%282022%29738219\\_EN.pdf?utm\\_source=chatgpt.com](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/738219/EPRS_BRI%282022%29738219_EN.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com), (accessed 16.02.2026).

7 Art. 18 (4) EUV

8 Interview 2, Official EEAS

9 Interview 1, Official DG TRADE, European Commission

10 Interview 4, Official German Economic Ministry

11 Interview 5, Former German Minister for Economy

12 Interview 4

Strategic debates and horizontal aspects of economic security within the Council are handled at the level of COREPER, the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the EU.<sup>13</sup> Given the wide range of issues discussed in COREPER, however, the body is heavily overstretched and dependent on preparatory work by the Trade Policy Committee (TPC).<sup>14</sup> Yet the TPC itself is already under significant pressure due to its extensive trade-related agenda.

Overall, EU economic security governance remains marked by a growing mismatch between EU-level policy design and fragmented national implementation. As recent cases demonstrate, this fragmentation creates coordination gaps that allow external economic pressure on individual Member States to translate into EU-wide effects within the Single Market. While a range of formal and informal coordination mechanisms exists, their limited effectiveness has exposed structural weaknesses in the current governance framework. These shortcomings have, in turn, fuelled ongoing debates on how EU economic security governance should be reformed.

## Current debates on reforming EU economic security governance

Debates on how to reform EU economic security governance are increasingly emerging both within and outside the EU institutions.

Building on the European Economic Security Strategy, the Commission and the HR/VP published a follow-up communication entitled “Strengthening EU Economic Security” in December 2025.<sup>15</sup> This communication, occasionally referred to as a “doctrine”, also includes several governance-

related elements. Notably, it takes up the proposal to appoint National Economic Security Advisers and calls on Member States to designate officials responsible for cross-ministerial coordination of risk assessments and mitigation measures. The Economic Security Network is likewise mentioned, complemented by a confidential advisory group drawn from the private sector. Finally, the doctrine proposes to establish an Economic Security Information Hub. The Information Hub is intended to consolidate and share intelligence on risks to the EU’s economic security, drawing on contributions from the Commission, the EEAS (including EU delegations in third countries) and potentially, Member States through existing coordination fora such as the Economic Security Network. The Council of the EU has likewise contributed proposals aimed at improving EU Economic Security Governance. One proposal is the creation of a new Council working group dedicated specifically to economic security.<sup>16</sup> The Hungarian Council Presidency, however, questioned whether an ad hoc working group would be able to adequately reflect the thematic breadth and technical complexity of the European Economic Security Strategy.<sup>17</sup>

In parallel, Council discussions also referred to existing informal coordination formats as potential sources of inspiration for strengthening horizontal coordination across Council structures. Rather than creating a single, dedicated working party, this approach would seek to link multiple thematic strands through a more flexible, cross-cutting governance logic. In this context, the Hungarian Council Presidency pointed to coordination models inspired by the Trade and Technology Council (TTC). Established in 2021, the TTC is a high-level coordination forum that brings together multiple thematic working groups to address trade,

<sup>13</sup> Interview 3, Official, Secretariat of the Council of the EU

<sup>14</sup> Interview 1 & 4

<sup>15</sup> European Commission & HR/VP (2025): [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – Strengthening EU Economic Security](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0020), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0020>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

<sup>16</sup> Interview 3 & Council of the European Union (2024): Governance of the European Economic Security Strategy, Council document (ST 14889/24)

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

technology and economic security issues in a strategic and non-legislative manner. While initially developed in the EU-US context, similar TTC formats have since been established with other partners, including India. As a governance model, the TTC illustrates how a “multi-working-party logic” could enhance horizontal coordination within the Council framework, while preserving the central role of COREPER.<sup>18 19</sup>

A recent proposal by Luuk van Middelaar and Hans Kribbe goes one step further. They claim that the EU needs an “Economic Security Council”<sup>20</sup>. This concept rests on the assumption that the strategic trade-offs demanded by today’s geo-economic order can only be addressed early and with sufficient political legitimacy at the highest political level, namely the European Council. Modelled loosely on the US National Security Council, the European Economic Security Council would operate on three levels. Strategic trade offs would be decided at leader level within the European Council. Preparatory work would take place at ambassadorial level, similar to COREPER, under the leadership of an Economic Security Adviser. The working level, tasked with the early identification of geo-strategically sensitive dossiers, would consist of national Economic


Security Advisers (one per Member State), alongside representatives from the Commission and the EEAS.

Ongoing debates on reforming EU Economic Security Governance span a wide range of proposals, from more incremental approaches that may not fully address structural challenges to more far-reaching ideas whose political feasibility remains limited. Taken together these proposals offer valuable starting points that can be built upon to develop a more coherent governance framework.

### Six recommendations to close the gaps in the EU’s economic security governance

Effective economic security governance requires strategic coordination and cross-sectoral coherence. To remain both ambitious and politically feasible, it should build on existing structures while introducing targeted enhancements. Drawing on the proposals discussed above and on expert interviews conducted for this research, six recommendations emerge for closing the remaining gaps in European economic security governance.

**Graph: Recommendations on how to improve the EU’s economic security governance**



18 Ibid.  
 19 The TTC is a Commission-led process. However, the reference in the Council document is to be understood explicitly in functional terms: It is not the commission-led governance, but the cross-working group, flexible working logic that serves as a model.  
 20 Kribbe, H. & Van Middelaar, L. (2025): *A European Economic Security Council: Making strategic trade-offs in the age of geoeconomics*. <https://big-europe.eu/publications/big007-a-european-economic-security-council-making-strategic-trade-offs-in-the-age-of-geoeconomics>.(accessed 16.02.2026).

### 1. Introduce a Subcommittee on Economic Security in the European Parliament

In the context of economic security, the European Parliament is rarely mentioned as a relevant actor. This largely reflects the Parliament's marginal role in the implementation of economic security instruments (see Table), given that security concerns are most frequently the competence of Member States.

Yet, as a co-legislator, the European Parliament remains a central arena for democratic scrutiny, agenda-setting and debate. Establishing a dedicated Subcommittee on Economic Security would allow Parliament to systematically scrutinise trade-security instruments, consolidate expertise across committees and serve as an institutional counterpart to executive-level coordination in the Council and Commission.

### 2. Establish an Economic Security Committee in the Council

All interviewed actors agreed that COREPER is overstretched and that the Trade Policy Committee is ill-suited to effectively address the cross-cutting nature of economic security. In order to preserve the Council's established working logic while ensuring effective coordination, an Economic Security Committee should therefore be established within the Council. Conceived as a functional equivalent to the Trade Policy Committee in terms of working methods and steering capacity, such a committee would not require a formal treaty basis, but would operate as a high-level preparatory body.

Robust preparatory work at working level is essential to ensure that the EU can respond to geopolitical developments at short notice. An Economic

Security Committee, closely linked to COREPER and exercising a structured steering function vis-à-vis the Commission, would help relieve COREPER and ensure that strategic decisions are based on coherent and well-prepared inputs, rather than fragmented sectoral perspectives.

### 3. Institutionalise the dialogue with EEAS delegations in third countries

As outlined above, the EEAS and the HR/VP are, by design, meant to act as bridge-builders between economic and security considerations in EU external action. In practice, however, the EEAS is often not perceived as a relevant actor by Member States. Lacking the necessary competences, it struggles to exercise the political leverage required for this role.

Even so, the EEAS retains a meaningful role in the EU's geoeconomic reorientation. The increasingly close cooperation between the Commission, in particular DG TRADE and the EEAS already represents a significant shift away from the EU's traditionally rigid institutional silos.<sup>21</sup>

For the EEAS to act as an effective bridge-builder between capitals and Brussels, it would need stronger political authority in Member States – authority it does not currently possess.<sup>22</sup>

Far greater potential lies in the EEAS's extensive network of EU delegations in third countries. With over 140 delegations worldwide, including to international organisations, the EEAS is uniquely positioned to provide early warnings and facilitate diplomatic communication on economic security-related measures, helping to prevent escalation at an early stage. Even where delegations are thinly staffed, their geoeconomic intelligence value remains considerable.

<sup>21</sup> Interview 1 & 2

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Interview 4,5 & 6

#### 4. Expand the Economic Security Network

The Economic Security Network established by the Commission is widely perceived as an effective forum for exchanges between Member States and between Member States and the Commission. It should therefore be maintained and further institutionalised.

As noted in the 2025 doctrine, expanding the Network to include representatives from the private sector is a sensible step. However, to ensure a balanced representation of interests, civil society actors such as unions should also be consulted.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, the participation of the HR/VP and/or the EEAS would strengthen the link between economic security coordination and the broader framework of EU external action.

#### 5. Appoint National Economic Security Advisers

Member States play a decisive role in the successful implementation of any EU economic security strategy, a point repeatedly emphasised by EU-level interviewees.<sup>24</sup> Many of the relevant competences remain at national level, alongside distinct national foreign policy traditions and dependency structures.

It is therefore essential that Member States develop their own national economic security strategies. At the same time, these strategies must be compatible with EU-level objectives. Within the internal market, national economic and security decisions quickly generate spillover effects for other Member States.<sup>25</sup>

Several Member States have already taken steps

to institutionalise economic security. Denmark, for example, has established a dedicated economic security unit within its Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Netherlands has created a subcommittee on “Economy and Security”, while France has adopted a national economic security strategy.<sup>26</sup> In Germany, the current coalition agreement announced the development of a national economic security strategy aligned with the European framework.<sup>27</sup> This has already led to institutional adjustments, including the creation of an economic security unit within the Foreign Office’s geoeconomics directorate<sup>28</sup>, as well as separate departments for national and European economic security within the Ministry for Economic Affairs.<sup>29</sup> Germany’s National Security Council, established in 2025, also explicitly includes economic security alongside internal, external and digital security.<sup>30</sup> In parallel, bilateral coordination initiatives, such as the Franco-German Economic Security Dialogue, have emerged.<sup>31</sup>

While these initiatives are important, they remain fragmented and insufficient to generate the level of strategic coherence required by the current geo-economic environment. The 2025 doctrine therefore recommends that each Member State appoints a National Economic Security Adviser.<sup>32</sup> These advisers could be convened regularly by the Commission or the Council. To be effective, this role would need to be positioned at a sufficiently senior level – for instance, at state secretary level – and should not be combined with extensive additional portfolios, in order to ensure adequate capacity and authority.<sup>33</sup>

23 Cf. Concept of „inclusive geoeconomics“ in: Winter, E. & Holst, L. (2025): [Rethinking economic security – the Port of Hamburg as a hub for inclusive geoeconomics](https://www.helmut-schmidt.de/en/news-1/detail/bkhs-perspectives-11-2025-rethinking-economic-security), <https://www.helmut-schmidt.de/en/news-1/detail/bkhs-perspectives-11-2025-rethinking-economic-security>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

24 Interview 1 & 2

25 Interview 4

26 Kribbe, H. & Van Middelaar, L. (2025): [A European Economic Security Council: Making strategic trade-offs in the age of geoeconomics](https://big-europe.eu/publications/big007-a-european-economic-security-council-making-strategic-trade-offs-in-the-age-of-geoeconomics), <https://big-europe.eu/publications/big007-a-european-economic-security-council-making-strategic-trade-offs-in-the-age-of-geoeconomics>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

27 Interview 4

28 German Federal Foreign Ministry (2025): [Organizational Chart](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/resource/blob/215270/976b4769a58ff2b2d8f9347567df6439/organisationsplan-data.pdf), <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/resource/blob/215270/976b4769a58ff2b2d8f9347567df6439/organisationsplan-data.pdf>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

29 German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (2025): [Organizational Chart](https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/M-O/organisationsplan-bundeswirtschaftsministerium.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=27), [https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/M-O/organisationsplan-bundeswirtschaftsministerium.pdf?\\_\\_blob=publicationFile&v=27](https://www.bundeswirtschaftsministerium.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/M-O/organisationsplan-bundeswirtschaftsministerium.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=27), (accessed 16.02.2026).

30 German Federal Government (2025): [Kernelemente der Geschäftsordnung des Nationalen Sicherheitsrates \(NSR\)](https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975228/2381766/9176b69acfa199c2e6d3e94d177d7cf0/2025-08-27-nationaler-sicherheitsrat-data.pdf?download=1), <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/975228/2381766/9176b69acfa199c2e6d3e94d177d7cf0/2025-08-27-nationaler-sicherheitsrat-data.pdf?download=1>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

31 German Federal Government (2025): [Franco-German Economic Agenda](https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/992814/2382172/c66956885b760592bbe25810ff81cb5e/2025-08-29-dt-fr-wirtschaftsagenda-data.pdf), <https://www.bundesregierung.de/resource/blob/992814/2382172/c66956885b760592bbe25810ff81cb5e/2025-08-29-dt-fr-wirtschaftsagenda-data.pdf>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

32 European Commission & HR/VP (2025): [Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council – Strengthening EU Economic Security](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0020), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52023JC0020>, (accessed 16.02.2026).

33 Interview 6

## 6. Install an HR/VP on Economic Security

Central to the successful implementation of the proposed measures is the existence of a single actor in whom the various coordination strands converge. Such a role is currently missing from the strategy presented by the Commission and the HR/VP. In the absence of a clearly defined focal point, the risk of renewed institutional fragmentation and policy silos remains high.

To address this gap, the establishment of a High Representative/Vice-President for Economic Security should be considered. Similar to the existing HR/VP, this position would be characterised by a dual institutional affiliation with both the Commission and the EEAS, ensuring coherence across internal and external policy dimensions. The key difference would lie in the portfolio. As international conflicts continue to intensify, the EU requires not only high-level leadership on geopolitics, but increasingly also on geo-economics. Economic Security in itself constitutes a sufficiently broad and complex policy field that it cannot realistically be combined with a wider foreign policy remit.

To ensure effective coordination and political accountability, the HR/VP for Economic Security should be subject to regular hearings before the proposed Subcommittee on Economic Security in the European Parliament. In addition, the Economic Security Committee in the Council should report regularly to the HR/VP, as should the EEAS through consolidated input from EU delegations. Finally, the HR/VP for Economic Security should chair the Economic Security Network, thereby positioning it as the central forum for structured exchange with Member States.

## Conclusion

The EU possesses a broad set of instruments and institutional mechanisms to address economic security challenges. From trade defence instruments

to national investment screening frameworks, the foundations for coordinated action are in place. Yet, as the cases of Nexperia and Lithuania illustrate, fragmentation and unilateralism at Member State level continue to undermine the EU's overall economic security. Neither informal platforms, such as the Economic Security Network, nor overstretched Council structures like COREPER and the Trade Policy Committee are adequately equipped to ensure sustained cross-sectoral coordination on economic security. While numerous proposals to reform the EU's economic security governance architecture are currently under discussion, many appear either politically infeasible or insufficiently ambitious to meet today's geo-economic challenges.

Effective economic security governance therefore requires building on existing structures while introducing targeted and politically realistic enhancements. Establishing an Economic Security Committee in the Council, a Subcommittee on Economic Security in the European Parliament and a dedicated HR/VP for Economic Security would provide high-level political steering, structured preparatory work and clear focal points for coordination across Member States and EU institutions. Crucially, these measures would allow complex trade-offs and sensitive dossiers at the intersection of trade and security to be addressed at the appropriate decision-making level, with coherent input and guidance, without the need for treaty change.

Economic security has emerged as a distinct and highly complex policy field that warrants leadership at the highest political level, alongside systematic monitoring and information exchange at working level. In an environment of intensifying geoeconomic pressure from both west and east, ensuring coherent and proactive governance is no longer optional, but a strategic prerequisite for safeguarding the EU's economic resilience and political autonomy.

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