The Arab/Muslim vote in the 2024 US elections

Aleena Khan is a Junior Lecturer at the Institute of Security and Global Affairs (ISGA) of Leiden University.

How does the Democratic Party’s stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict influence the voting behavior of Arab/Muslim voters in swing states during the 2024 presidential elections and future conflict resolution initiatives towards de-escalating this conflict?

The Israel-Palestine conflict resurged in October 2023 after Hamas’s attack on Israeli citizens and, as of October 2024, has now spread to Lebanon and parts of Yemen as well. The conflict has had world-wide ramifications, but this policy brief will only study its impact on the 2024 United States presidential elections. The issue is of great importance to Arab/Muslim voters, a constituency making up a large percentage of swing-states. In order to facilitate a de-escalation of the conflict, it is of utmost importance for American and European heads of state to work quickly towards conflict resolution initiatives. All state leaders should push for the delivery of humanitarian aid to those civilians in Gaza and the occupied West Bank, as well as civilians affected by Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. Additionally, those European state leaders should pressure the US state leader to halt its support to Israel in the form of weapons deliveries to avoid escalation of violence and warfare in all concerned regions.

The Democratic Party’s switch

Before he dropped out, President Biden was actively losing a part of his voter base, specifically Arab/Muslim voters. Voters were vowing to remain ‘uncommitted’ in unprecedented numbers as a public display of opposition to the US’s support of Israel. These voters have three main demands: “achieving an enduring ceasefire, imposing an arms embargo on Israel, and lifting the siege on Gaza” (Harb, 2024). President Biden’s strong stance in support of Israel has kept him alienated from these voters. Although Vice President and Democratic nominee Kamala Harris has been significantly involved in overseeing US policy on the war, her support of Israel and its war seems more tempered than Biden’s (Harb, 2024). Harris becoming the new Democratic nominee has already attracted large swaths of voters. For example, the Black Muslim Leadership Council Fund who had previously declared itself uncommitted to Biden has now publicly endorsed Harris (Alcindor, 2024).

The Arab/Muslim vote in the US

Although Muslims only make up about 1% of the American population, they are concentrated in swing states. In 2020, about 65% of Muslim voters in swing states voted for President Biden – this support was essential to his electoral victory, because he won those states by small margins (Mogahed and Selod, 2024). He won in Georgia by only 12,000 votes, where 61,000 Muslims voted, and in Pennsylvania by 81,000 votes, where 125,000 Muslims voted. Research conducted by the Pew Research Center shows that Muslim Americans are more inclined than other religious groups to be in support of Palestinian sovereignty (Alpher et al. 2024). Muslim Americans are united in support of the Palestinian cause in a way that has not yet been seen in American political history, and this could be costly to the Democrats if policies important to key constituencies are not addressed before the elections. 

Harris’s approach towards this conflict

Though Harris has shown some vocal support for both Israel and Palestine, the Palestinian community and their allies feel an air of silencing in regard to support for Palestine. Leaders of the previously mentioned “Uncommitted” movement had long been negotiating for a Palestinian-American to speak at the Democratic National Convention held in August 2024. Their request was denied, and the Harris campaign entirely refused to comment on that decision. Despite that, the parents of a hostage taken by Hamas, Hersh Goldberg-Polin, were allowed to speak at the convention. This decision led to the belief by Arab/Muslim constituents that her administration is wanting to include one side of this issue more than the other, which led to a massive protest outside of the venue hosting the convention (Cappelletti, 2024).

Disclaimer: This policy brief focuses only on possible outcomes where the Democratic candidate is successful in order to explicitly detail those outcomes. The possibility of a Republican electoral victory lies beyond the scope of this brief.

Scenario 1: Harris wins and shifts policy 

If Harris takes office in January 2025, she has the ability to shift the US’s current policies and diplomatic relations with Israel. Though this brief touches upon both before and after election night, here the potential aftermath of the election will be detailed. 

Firstly, in this scenario, Harris increases the amount of aid given to those communities devastated by the impact of Israel’s strikes in Palestine and Lebanon. The military aid currently being given in the form of weapons to the Israeli military makes up over 300 billion US dollars. Here, a portion of the money being sent would be halted to give humanitarian assistance to civilians, in the form of food, clothes, shelter, and medical care. The US announced an amount of over 300 million US dollars will be given to Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank (Psaledakis, 2024). In this scenario, Harris pledges more than 500 million US dollars, and this aid continues in increasing increments that match the needs of those communities.

Israel is already the largest cumulative recipient of US aid, both economic and military (Masters and Merrow, 2024). In a policy shift, Harris reconsiders the aid given to Israel in accordance with the Leahy Law, which prohibits US aid from going to foreign military units or individuals suspected of committing gross human rights violations (Lumpe, 2014). Even before October 7, the United States “found five units of the Israel’s security forces responsible for gross violations of human rights”, and yet they did not bar any of those units from continuing to receive US military aid, four of which were able to “remediate” the cases in line with State Department policy (Lewis and Zengerle, 2024). These violations reported by human rights groups included extrajudicial murders, torture, and physical abuse, mostly committed against Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank (US State Department, 2024).

Lastly, the Harris administration applies enhanced pressure to push the United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 2735 (2024) into acceptance by both the Israeli government and Hamas. The resolution encompasses three phases, including the release of hostages by both sides, return of Palestinian civilians to their homes, safe distribution of humanitarian assistance, an end of hostilities, and a reconstruction plan. The resolution was announced by the US, who claim Israel has accepted it. However, no action has been taken since its proposal in June 2024. Netanyahu is skeptical of the deal, wanting to continue with “destroying Hamas”; while Hamas has said they are ready to negotiate the deal with Israel, but will still “continue its struggle against Israeli occupation” (Lederer, 2024). The Harris administration increases momentum in mediating negotiations between both the Israeli government and Hamas by sending diplomats to the region and facilitating outreach towards Iran, encouraging them to pressure Hezbollah, who have now become a major participant in this conflict, and Hamas. 

Scenario 2: Harris wins and sticks with current policy 

If Harris is elected and does not shift policy at all, the likelihood of the war continuing with even more devastating impact to more regions in the Middle East is probable. Here, Harris’ actions before the elections will be discussed in order to attempt to understand what her cabinet is planning to do in regard to this issue.
In this scenario, once in office Harris continues a cautious and unclear approach towards the conflict in Gaza. So far, this strategy has allowed her to maintain the support of most of Biden’s supporters as well as bring in some voters who would be considered more progressive or are a part of communities concerned about the conflict. 

Vice President Harris hired Nasrina Bargzie as her liason to Arab and Muslims voters. Bargzie’s role will be to lead the outreach initiative to these communities (Lucente, 2024). Harris also appointed Ilan Goldberg as the lead for outreach to the Jewish community. These appointments show that Harris is attempting to include all relevant parties to the conflict in Gaza in her campaign approach. In a muddled scenario, once elected the Harris administration loses focus on these outreach efforts, while divisions between the two groups grow. 
In the scenario in which Harris follows in the footsteps of her predecessor, she will face a lot of opposition from his constituents and possibly also people working with her. For example, Tariq Habash quit his position within the US Department of Education in January 2024 since “he could no longer represent an administration that does not value all human life equally” (Al Jazeera, 2024).

Post-election policy

If the Democratic Party keeps the White House American and European state leaders must work to emphasize the importance of working towards conflict resolution initiatives in regard to the ongoing conflict in Gaza, the occupied West Bank, and Lebanon. Until after the election is complete, it will remain in the interest of Harris to please all constituents with varying views on the direction needed to be taken. After her inauguration, Harris will have room to amend policy decisions. This is where the proposed policy recommendations come into action.
Firstly, it is crucial for interest groups, US governors and congress members, and European leaders to apply diplomatic pressure towards Harris to reconsider US aid to the specific units of the Israeli military, in accordance with the Leahy Law. To uphold its own credibility, the US must stand in accordance with the Leahy Law in the context of this conflict. If the Israeli military is accused of gross violations of human rights, it is the responsibility of the Harris administration to halt military aid to them or their subsections.

Secondly, American and European state leaders must ensure humanitarian assistance is delivered to those communities devastated by conflict. This conflict has now spread to other regions of the Middle East, including Lebanon. It is pertinent to ensure an adequate humanitarian response goes to all affected communities. This should be done by working with NGOs in the communities themselves, ensuring them an adequate amount of financial assistance to carry out their work. The advice of international humanitarian organizations must be heeded when deciding how to deliver aid. The UN and other humanitarian organizations have advised that the aid given by the US is a small fraction of what is needed and that they must use land routes to get resources to Gaza. Additionally, the American government must ensure the financial aid they administer is received by its target, especially since the US-built pier proved ineffective (Gritten, 2024). It is pertinent for American and European policymakers to lobby with Israeli military officials to lift restrictions on delivering aid to civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law.

Lastly, American and European state leaders must push for negotiations between the Israeli government and Hamas in accordance with the UNSC’s resolution 2735 (2024). This initiative should include frequent visits by key figures of the Harris administration, especially the Secretary of State, to Israel and Palestine in order to emphasise urgency of decision-making. As there is currently no political will from either side to end the conflict, it is pertinent for the US and its allies to create an urgency for them both. The European Council of the EU should also be involved in these negotiations to show transatlantic unity in regard to this conflict. 

Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
 

References

Alcindor, Yamiche (2024): Black Muslim group endorses Harris after its ‘uncommitted’ stance on Biden, NBC News, Muslim group endorses Harris after 'uncommitted' stance on Biden (nbcnews.com) (accessed on 04/09/2024).

Al Jazeera (2024): Q&A: Former Biden appointee says US policy is ‘dehumanising’ Palestinians, www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/9/qa-former-biden-appointee-says-us-policy-is-dehumanising-palestinians (accessed on 05/10/2024).

Alper, Becka; Keeter, Scott; Lippert, Jordan; Mohamed, Besheer; Silver, Laura (2024): Majority in U.S. Say Israel Has Valid Reasons for Fighting; Fewers Say the Same about Hamas, Majority in US Say Israel's Reasons for Fighting Hamas Are Valid | Pew Research Center (accessed on 12/09/2024).

Cappelletti (2024): ‘The answer is no’: Pro-Palestinian delegates say their request for a speaker at DNC was shut down, Pro-Palestinian delegates say their request for a speaker at DNC was shut down | AP News (accessed on 11/09/2024).

Data for Progress (2024): Voters Support the U.S. Calling for Permanent Ceasefire in Gaza and Conditioning Military Aid to Israel, Voters Support the U.S. Calling for Permanent Ceasefire in Gaza and Conditioning Military Aid to Israel (dataforprogress.org) (accessed on 11/09/2024).

Gritten, David (2024): US military ends Gaza floating aid pier mission, www.bbc.com/news/articles/c728337zy1lo (accessed on 13/09/2024). 

Harb, Ali (2024): Kamala Harris shifts tone on Gaza, but advocates say US voters want more, Al Jazeera, Kamala Harris shifts tone on Gaza, but advocates say US voters want more | US Election 2024 News | Al Jazeera (accessed on 04/09/2024).

Lederer, Edith (2024): UN Security Council adopts a cease-fire resolution aimed at ending Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, apnews.com/article/un-us-security-council-israel-hamas-ceasefire-834734f606a5245cc46a2487a70ae3fa (accessed on 05/10/2024).

Lewis, Simon; Zengerle, Patricia (2024): US Implicates 5 Israeli units in rights violations before Gaza war, no restrictions on assistance, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/us-found-five-israeli-military-units-committed-gross-human-rights-violations-2024-04-29/ (accessed on 04/10/2024).

Lucente, Adam (2024): Who is Nasrina Bargzie, Kamala Harris’ liaison to Arab and Muslim voters?,https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/08/who-nasrina-bargzie-kamala-harris-liaison-arab-and-muslim-voters (accessed on 08/09/2024).

Lumpe, Lora (2014): What the Leahy Law Means for Human Rights, www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/what-leahy-law-means-human-rights (accessed on 21/10/2024).

Masters, Jonathan; Merrow, Will (2024): U.S. Aid to Israel in Four Charts, www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israel-four-charts (accessed on 04/10/2024).

Psaledakis, Daphne (2024): US to announce over $300 million in aid for Palestinians in Gaza, West Bank, www.reuters.com/world/us-announce-over-300-million-aid-palestinians-gaza-west-bank-2024-09-30/ (accessed on 04/10/2024).

US State Department (2024): 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel, West Bank and Gaza, www.state.gov/reports/2023-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/israel-west-bank-and-gaza/ (accessed on 25/10/2024).

The US elections and peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel

Isabell Kump is a policy advisor with the Munich Security Conference

The US elections come at a time when US policy towards West Africa and the Sahel is at a critical juncture. Regardless of who wins the presidency, the US and its European partners will need to improve coordination, the lack of which has long characterised collaboration in the region.

The US presidential elections on 5 November come at a time when the US finds itself in a position of waning influence in West Africa and the Sahel. Authorities in Niger and Chad ordered US troops to leave, calling years of US engagement in question. The withdrawal from Niger is particularly consequential because the country has been a linchpin for the US in the region. Since 2013, the US has relied on Niger as a strategic location from which to monitor terrorist activity. Consequently, the US is now reviewing its strategy and partnerships with countries in the region.

However, any change in regional strategy by the current administration under President Joe Biden could be reversed by either presidential candidate. For most of the campaign thus far, neither Donald Trump nor Kamala Harris have addressed foreign policy towards West Africa and the Sahel as a prominent issue. But the new president will inevitably need to address the future of US engagement in the region and respond to developments on the ground.

As there are only a few hints as to which direction US policy towards the region may take, the building of scenarios can help anticipate what the presidential candidates may do after taking office. This policy brief presents two scenarios to illustrate possible consequences and implications of either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump winning the election. This exercise will also deal with the effects for European countries, which are reviewing their regional policies, too. 

The situation in West Africa and the Sahel

In recent years, the Sahel, which is in part located in West Africa, has become a global hotspot of terrorism. In 2022, 43 per cent of all global terrorism deaths were recorded in the Sahel, with Burkina Faso witnessing the largest increase in terrorism deaths from 759 in 2021 to 1,135 deaths in 2022 (Institute for Economics & Peace 2023).

Once Africa’s democratic poster child, West Africa has faced the repercussions of an insurgency that started in 2012 and has plunged the region into uncertainty. After the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, ethnic Tuareg people who had been fighting alongside then-dictator Muammar Gaddafi returned to northern Mali and joined a separatist rebellion against the Malian state. The insurgency resulted in a coup against then-President Amadou Toumani Touré. Whilst the insurgency was ended with the help of a Frenchled coalition and the conclusion of a peace accord in 2015, Mali has since remained divided. In the following years, numerous actors, including the UN, the EU, the African Union, the US and France, enhanced their support not only for Mali but also for neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger; their aim was to restore stability through a mix of humanitarian assistance and development, military and security cooperation. Despite the increasing engagement from outside actors, the security situation deteriorated further. It has worsened not only in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, but also in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Togo.

US policy towards West Africa and the Sahel

US engagement in West Africa and the Sahel is in line with the overall US strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa, which has been fairly consistent over the past decades. Since 9/11, the US has largely focused on counterterrorism in various parts of Africa. To combat terrorist groups like Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin or al Qaeda and ISIS affiliates in the Sahel, it established a network of military bases. In addition, the US has expanded its partnerships with African militaries and advised, trained and assisted them via the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). Seeing underdevelopment as a driver of terrorism, insecurity and state failure, the US has complemented its military efforts with development and humanitarian assistance. But despite the goal of balancing diplomacy, defence and development, development has taken the back seat.

During Trump’s presidency, US policy towards the region largely stayed on course. At the outset, concerns were high that his administration would roll back military and development assistance. His statements towards these countries did not bode well. In 2013, he tweeted about then-President Barack Obama’s Power Africa project: “Every penny of the $7 billion going to Africa as per Obama will be stolen – corruption is rampant!” (Trump 2013). Five years later, during his presidency, he dubbed African states “shithole countries” (Watkins and Phillip 2018). Yet, despite Trump’s harsh rhetoric and threats to downsize the UN mission MINUSMA in Mali, US support continued unabated. Development cooperation also remained unaltered, not least because the US Congress, with the help of Republican votes, prevented the administration from cutting USAID’s budget by almost a third (von Soest 2021).

President Biden sought to reframe the region’s importance. He stressed the need to renew US Africa policy and promised to prioritise democracy promotion, including in West Africa. In 2022, his administration added five West African countries, including Benin and Togo, to its 2019 Global Fragility Act and added the prevention of violent conflict in unstable regions as a new component of its strategy. The choice of countries signalled that West African stability was a US interest. 

However, Biden’s plans were overtaken by developments in the Sahel, where military coups took place in Mali, Guinea, Chad, Burkina Faso and Niger. The coup in Niger in particular has put the US in a tight spot between its commitment to promoting democracy and its interest-based foreign policy. The trade-off became obvious when it took the US weeks to call the overthrow a coup. Doing so would have meant cutting off military assistance and part of its development cooperation. After a while, the US called it a coup but pronounced that it would keep communications open. According to AFRICOM’s Commander General Michael E. Langley, the US aimed to continue dialogue to get the juntas “on a roadmap back to democracy” (Akinyemi and Ewokor 2024). 

Eventually, it was the Nigerien junta that ended its military partnership with the US. Among the reasons given by Nigerien officials was that the US had pursued a one-sided security relationship and pressured Niger to limit ties with Russia and Iran (Kupemba 2024). While the US decided to maintain its Niamey embassy and its engagement in other policy areas, it agreed to withdraw its troops by 15 September (U.S. Department of Defense 2024). Authorities on both sides are still trying to underscore their commitment to ongoing diplomatic dialogue. The question now is how the US will remain engaged in West Africa and the Sahel.

Scenarios: “America first” or “America is back again”

Regardless of who assumes the presidency in 2025, the new administration will have to grapple with declining US influence in the region. To anticipate possible consequences and implications for the region, the two scenarios are set one year after each candidate has taken office. 

Harris I: America is still back

On 5 November 2024, Kamala Harris won the US presidential election by a slim margin. While her election campaign did not disclose many hints about her vision for future relations between the US and West African countries, her election brought a sense of relief and optimism to the region; finally, a president was in office who had visited African countries, such as Ghana, after the last presidential visit to the continent occurred under Barack Obama in 2013.

One year after President Kamala Harris took office, optimism among West African actors has largely remained. As many experts predicted, Harris embarked on a similar foreign policy course to her predecessor, implementing the 2022 Africa Strategy and the 10-year plan to encourage stability and prevent conflicts that the Biden administration launched in 2023. The plan moves away from prioritising military approaches and instead aims to foster social cohesion and government responsiveness. Nevertheless, to maintain a military footprint in the region, the Harris administration has just concluded an agreement with Ghana that will allow the US to station reconnaissance drones at the country’s airfields to continue surveillance of terrorists. Negotiations took two years but were eventually successful because Ghana has seen rising insecurity on its northern border with Burkina Faso and considers coordinated US intelligence operations as a way to maintain security in the region. To demonstrate that it is a partnership on equal footing and high-level support for a strengthened relationship, Vice President Tim Walz also travelled to Accra to sign the agreement.

But the optimism among West African policymakers may soon fade. For one thing, President Harris has inherited the challenge that US ambitions to promote democracy and development have not been matched by sufficient funding. Leaving this issue unaddressed threatens the credibility of President Harris and US support in general, but it also leaves funding gaps in promised climate finance, financial resources the region desperately needs. Moreover, the Harris administration has been unable to find common ground with Sahel countries, especially Niger. Talks are still ongoing, but since the coup in Niger in July 2023, the US has remained in an observer position, watching Russia’s Africa Corps strengthen its foothold in the region and contribute to even higher levels of human rights abuses and insecurity than in the years before. Developments point to further destabilisation of the region rather than the opposite.

Trump II: America first again?

The re-election of Donald Trump in November 2024 heightened concerns and fears in West Africa and the Sahel. However, one year into Trump’s presidency, there are cautious hopes in West Africa and the Sahel that he may not follow through on his earlier announcements after all. So far, his administration has not cut military and security assistance, has extended the African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA), which was due to expire in 2025, and, surprisingly, he has not announced the reduction of USAID’s budget for climate policies; funding that Project 2025, a blueprint for the next conservative presidency by the Heritage Foundation, proposed to rescind altogether (Primorac 2023). Nor has he questioned established partnerships with countries in the region. However, he has not addressed future relations with Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad either after the US had to withdraw troops from the region in the summer of 2024.

Nevertheless, decision-makers in the region remain vigilant because changes in regional policy could come up at any time during his presidency. Much of his administration’s “inactivity” can be attributed to the fact that, contrary to expectations, his administration needed significant time to get sorted out and fill many key positions. It is now being reported that representatives from Mauritania and Morocco are expected to pay a state visit to Washington in the coming months to discuss the explosion in the number of terrorist attacks in the Sahel, a development which concerns both countries. Since the US left its base in Niger in September 2024, terrorist groups have expanded their strongholds across the region. However, the crises in the Sahel do not seem to be of interest to Donald Trump, not even the fact of a greater rivalry between the US and Russia in the region. Authorities in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have already realised that cooperation with Russia’s Africa Corps is not yielding the expected progress in counterterrorism in their countries, but they do not expect any better kind of security and military partnership from the current US administration. 

Implications for transatlantic partners and policy recommendations 

The implications of the US presidential elections for US policy towards West Africa and the Sahel are relevant not only for the African region, but also for European countries. Over the past decade, European countries, especially France and Germany, have been supporting the region through various forms of assistance alongside the US. After the coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, the authorities ended military and security cooperation with European partners, too, and, in the case of France, cut diplomatic ties. Against this background, it is vital for European countries to anticipate the trajectory of US regional policy under a new administration. With regard to the scenarios described in this policy brief, the following recommendations can be derived for US and European policymakers:

If Kamala Harris becomes president, the US and its European partners should improve coordination of their respective development and humanitarian assistance to maximise their impact. Although several international partners launched the Sahel Alliance in 2017, coordination among them has never been ideal, struggling with incoherence and missing effectiveness of the multiple programmes. In addition, the EU should ensure that its activities under the new Gulf of Guinea Security Defence Initiative mission, which it has launched in countries such as Ghana and Benin, are coordinated with the US security and defence partnerships with these countries. They should also align their approaches and streamline their objectives with regard to engaging with the military juntas. This could increase their joint credibility vis-à-vis the military juntas and convince them that they are more reliable and stronger partners in fighting terrorism than Russia.

If Donald Trump becomes president again, European policymakers should coordinate activities with the US in development cooperation, diplomacy and military and security assistance, too. But they should be cautious and make contingency plans in case Trump changes the course of US policy after all. European countries should develop their own policies in the region and not, for instance, rely on US regional assets. Donald Trump demonstrated in his previous term in office that Europe cannot rely on him. Yet, European countries should still try to convince a possible Trump administration that engaging with the Sahel countries is in the US interest. His administration, for its part, should be careful not to underestimate how Russia’s activities in the Sahel also threaten US national security.

Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.

References

Akinyemi, Aaron/Ewokor, Chris (2024): “We Are Still Engaged With West African Juntas” – US Africom Head Gen Michael Langley, BBC, perma.cc/G83J-4JBT (accessed on August 26, 2024).

Institute for Economics & Peace (2023): Global Terrorism Index 2023: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, Institute for Economics & Peace, 4, 13.

Kupemba, Danai Nesta (2024): US Troops to Leave Niger by Mid-September, BBC, perma.cc/BE6N-RFTA (accessed on August 26, 2024). 

Primorac, Max (2023): Agency for International Development, in: Roberts, Kevin/Dans, Paul (eds.): Mandate for Leadership: The Conservative Promise, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 257. 

Trump, Donald (2013): "Every Penny of the $7 Billion Going to Africa as Per Obama Will be Stolen - Corruption is Rampant!", X, perma.cc/RUS2-ZG4H (accessed on August 26, 2024).

US Department of Defense (2024): Senior Defense Official and Senior Military Official Hold a Background Briefing on Niger, perma.cc/62Y8-C5WA (accessed on August 26, 2024). 

von Soest, Christian (2021): The End of Apathy: The New Africa Policy Under Joe Biden, Hamburg: GI-GA, GIGA Focus 2, March, 4–5.

Watkins, Eli/Phillip, Abby (2018): “Trump Decries Immigrants From "Shithole Countries" Coming to US,” CNN, perma.cc/2864-YMYW (accessed on August 26, 2024).

The US strategic approach to the South China Sea after the 2024 US elections

Anta Maulana Nasution is a Researcher at the National Research and Innovation Agency of the Republic of Indonesia (NRIA)

The United States plays a pivotal role in the evolving dynamics of the South China Sea. US foreign policy, from President Obama's administration to that of President Biden, has positioned the country as a counterbalance to China's expanding influence in the region. In the wake of the 2024 elections, it is essential that the US formulates a more constructive foreign policy to mitigate the risk of escalating tensions or conflict with China in the region. A key priority should be the settlement of maritime boundary disputes between ASEAN member states (the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia) and China. Efforts must focus on preventing these disputes from escalating into conflicts that could undermine the security and stability of the region.

Introduction

This policy brief aims to provide recommendations to US policymakers following the 2024 US presidential election, focusing on formulating constructive policies to address issues in the South China Sea (SCS) and to prevent further deterioration of security and stability in the region.

The SCS conflict is frequently described as the “mother of all territorial disputes” (Beukel 2010), involving multiple nations, including China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia (all except China are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)). These countries have overlapping territorial claims concerning sovereignty and sovereign rights in the SCS (Raharjo et al. 2021). China contends that the entire SCS falls under its jurisdiction, based on the so-called “nine-dash line”, a claim widely regarded as lacking a basis in international law. 

The parties involved in the dispute have attempted various measures to find a resolution, including approaches through international law and bilateral discussions, as undertaken by Vietnam and the Philippines through several bilateral talks with China (Amer 2014; Fravel 2011). However, to date, there has been no agreement on the boundaries of each country’s sovereignty. The Philippines also pursued a legal approach by submitting the case to the International Arbitration Court (Permanent Court of Arbitration). The ruling issued on 12 July 2016 determined that China's historical claims were inconsistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982, a decision China rejected. Similarly, the US has consistently dismissed China’s claims as lacking legal basis and has dismissed them. As a non-ASEAN country, the US has strongly supported the 2016 Arbitration Court’s ruling in favour of the Philippines against China's claims.

For the states involved in the SCS dispute, the US is considered as a balancing power against China in the region. The US also has a vested interest in maintaining a presence in the SCS, driven by three key factors. Firstly, safeguarding the security of trade routes in Asia is crucial, as one-third of global shipping and 14 per cent of US maritime trade passes through the SCS (China Power Team 2021). Secondly, the US is seeking to preserve its influence in Southeast Asia, particularly as China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has steadily increased its regional presence. Thirdly, the US firmly upholds the principle of freedom of navigation and operations throughout countries’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), as enshrined in the UNCLOS 1982, given that US civilian and military vessels operate in nearly all international waters. 

The ongoing dispute in the SCS increasingly resembles a strategic battleground between the US and China in their pursuit of hegemony within the Southeast Asian region. Prior to China’s rise as a superpower, the US already wielded considerable influence over ASEAN member states. In terms of trade in goods and services, the US is ASEAN's second-largest trading partner after China (Medina 2023). In its efforts to maintain dominance in Southeast Asia, the US is likely to support ASEAN member states involved in disputes with China in the SCS while simultaneously advancing its own strategic interests. On multiple occasions, however, the presence of US military in the SCS has exacerbated tensions with China with negative implications for regional stability. 

The US’s policy track record in the South China Sea

It is important to recognise that China has consistently undertaken assertive actions in the SCS, including the construction of artificial islands and military installations, particularly in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Furthermore, according to Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), China has stationed coast guard vessels to assert control over these areas. 

During President Obama's administration, US foreign policy shifted its focus in a strategic reorientation termed the “Pivot to Asia”. One of the primary objectives of this policy was to promote stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region, with particular emphasis on the US playing a more prominent role in addressing the SCS conflict. President Obama's successor, President Trump, pursued a similar approach in the SCS. Though with differences in style, the approach from Obama through Trump and Biden has been largely consistent. 

The future stability and peace of the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in the SCS, will be significantly influenced by US foreign policy after the 2024 presidential election. An inappropriate shift in US policy could potentially escalate the dispute into a broader conflict and diminish US influence in the region, thereby directly altering the geopolitical and geostrategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, a non-aggressive approach is required to minimise violence and reduce the militarisation of US foreign policy towards the SCS dispute.

Expectations in the South China Sea post-US election 2024

A Kamala Harris victory is expected to largely continue the policies of the Biden administration, particularly concerning issues in the SCS. On multiple occasions, Harris has represented President Biden in formal meetings with ASEAN countries, such as at the 2023 ASEAN Summit. Moreover, it is anticipated that Harris will actively engage US allies and strategic partners to address ongoing issues in the SCS. For instance, in 2022, as part of its strategy for the SCS, the US announced initiatives to enhance maritime domain awareness across the Indo-Pacific through joint patrols and exercises in the SCS in collaboration with Australia, Japan and India—collectively known as the “Quad” (Dolven et al. 2023). This group is also planning a series of naval drills in the SCS scheduled for 2024. Such actions are likely to escalate tensions between the US and China in the region.

A Donald Trump victory is expected to further escalate tensions in the SCS, particularly with China. Although the US has maintained a consistent policy on the SCS since the Obama administration, Trump’s approach is significantly more assertive and relies on a stronger military presence in the region. During his previous term in office, the US strategically sought to counter China's increasingly assertive behaviour in the SCS, notably by enhancing its own military presence (Hutagalung 2024). This approach contributed to heightened tensions between the US and China in the SCS, as exemplified in 2020 when both nations showcased their military capabilities. Although these actions did not escalate into armed conflict, the risk was there.

Strategic policy recommendations for US engagement in the South China Sea post-2024

Recommendations if Harris wins
If Harris wins the 2024 US presidential election, US policymakers should prioritise two key actions:

1.    Fostering constructive dialogue on South China Sea issues within regional forums

The US frequently engages in official forums or meetings involving member states of ASEAN and China, such as the ASEAN-US Summit, East Asia Summit, ASEAN-US Dialogue, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and Indo-Pacific regional forums. In these forums, the US has the opportunity to shape the dialogue agenda by raising issues related to the SCS dispute. These platforms enable the US to reaffirm its strategic interests and its stance regarding the situation in the SCS.

Dialogue within official regional forums is essential for managing disputes and preventing their escalation into conflict. Moreover, such discussions serve to underscore the significance of developments in the SCS to all parties involved. The US should prioritise fostering constructive dialogue, avoid the pursuit of unilateral interests and support nations engaged in regional disputes with China. It is equally important that the US exercises caution by refraining from introducing sensitive issues that may provoke China, thereby maintaining a balanced and diplomatic approach.

2.    Excluding non-ASEAN member states from military activities in the region.

The actions of the US, in collaboration with its partners and allies (e.g. in the Quad formation), such as conducting patrols or joint exercises in the vicinity of the SCS, may be interpreted in various ways. China could perceive these activities as provocations, potentially escalating tensions and prolonging the settlements of maritime boundary disputes in the SCS. Instead of involving Quad countries in military contexts (such as patrols and exercises), it would be more beneficial to encourage these nations to enhance economic cooperation with ASEAN members. It is crucial to emphasise that disputes can only be resolved by the parties directly involved. Countries not directly involved can only serve as external actors in the dispute settlement process. For example, the US could advocate for its partner countries to provide diplomatic support to ASEAN member states engaged in disputes with China in the SCS.

Recommendations if Trump wins
If Trump wins the 2024 US presidential election, US policymakers should focus on: 

1.    Enhancing military confidence through capacity building instead of deploying military means

It is crucial to acknowledge that China's military capabilities exceed those of the ASEAN member states engaged in disputes with China over the SCS (Global Fire Power 2024). Rather than adopting an assertive stance through military activities in the SCS, which could heighten tensions, the US should pursue a more diplomatic approach by military capacity building initiatives, such as joint exercises, with countries involved in territorial disputes with China. These exercises must be conducted within the territories of the respective countries and not in the disputed areas of the SCS.

The enhancement of the military capacity and capabilities of these ASEAN countries will serve to bolster their confidence in their ability to defend themselves against China's assertive actions in the SCS. The US has historically contributed to this capacity building by conducting joint exercises with ASEAN countries, such as Balikatan (with the Philippines), Komodo and Garuda Shield (with Indonesia), Keris Strike (with Malaysia), Cobra Gold (with Vietnam), Tiger Balm (with Singapore), Naval Engagement Activity (with Vietnam) and Carat (with several ASEAN countries). It would be prudent for future US policy to aim not only to sustain but also to expand these programmes by enhancing naval training capacity. Such capacity building not only benefits the ASEAN member states, but also aids the US in maintaining a balance of power against China in the Southeast Asian region.

2.    Minimise independent US naval military activities in the South China Sea.

In the context of growing geopolitical tensions, particularly in the SCS, military propaganda can intensify existing conflicts. Therefore, it is essential for US policymakers to exercise prudence by avoiding any actions that could provoke or escalate aggression from China. A key measure in this regard is the reduction of excessive military activities, especially in the SCS. While the US may view initiatives such as freedom of navigation operations as part of its role as a “guardian of the region”, these actions carry the potential to heighten tensions. Ultimately, it is the countries within the region that will bear the most severe negative consequences of any potential escalation.

The 2024 US presidential election will not only shape the future direction of the US, but will also impact security and stability in the SCS, particularly concerning maritime boundary disputes. Although these disputes need to be resolved by the nations directly involved, the US can play a pivotal role and potentially accelerate the settlement of disputes in the SCS depending on how the US formulates its strategic approach in the region.

Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
 
References 

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Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative: China Island Tracker, AMTI Center for Strategic & International Studies, amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china/ (accessed on August 19, 2024)

Beukel, Erik (2010): China and the South China Sea: Two faces of power in the rising China’s neighborhood policy, DIIS Working Paper 2010: 07. Danish Institute for International Studies.

China Power Team (2021): How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? China Power. chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/ (accessed on March 28, 2024)

Dolven, Ben, Campbell, Caitlin, O’Rourke, Ronald (2023): China Primer: South China Sea Disputes, Congressional Research Service, crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10607 (accessed on March 27, 2024)

Fravel, Taylor (2011): China’s Strategy in the South China Sea, in: Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 33, 3: 292-319. 

Global Fire Power (2024): Asian Military Strength 2024, Global Fire Power, www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing-asia.php (accessed on August 21, 2024)

Hutagalung, Simon (2024): Would Trump go soft on the South China Sea?, Asia Times, asiatimes.com/2024/03/would-trump-go-soft-on-the-south-china-sea/ (accessed on August 19, 2024)

Medina, Ayman Falak (2023): An Overview of US Trade and Investment in ASEAN, ASEAN Briefing, www.aseanbriefing.com/news/an-overview-of-us-trade-and-investment-in-asean/ (accessed on August 12, 2024)

Raharjo, Sandy Nur Ikfal, Maulana, Anta and Nufus, Hayati (2021): Indonesia’s third party role in the South China Sea conflict Management: Assesing Interests, effectiveness, and chance of cross-border cooperation in: Indonesian Journal of Political Research, Volume 2,1, 1-16.

Battle beyond the ballot: Will US support for Ukraine hold? 

By Polina Murygina, Lawyer and Investigator, Center for Transparency and Accountability (Lithuania)

As the 2024 US presidential election approaches, the fate of Ukraine hangs in the balance. With Democratic nominee Kamala Harris likely to uphold the Biden administration's strong support for Ukraine, the potential return of Donald Trump could dramatically reshape US foreign policy, putting at risk vital aid for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. This pivotal election not only impacts Ukraine's struggle for sovereignty, but could also redefine global alliances and security dynamics. Will transatlantic unity withstand the storm of political change, or will the world witness a shift that emboldens aggression and undermines stability? 

Context and relevance
The current global landscape is marked by severe geopolitical instability: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Hamasled violence in Israel extending into Lebanon, civil wars and terrorist attacks threaten global peace more than ever. Among these, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is particularly alarming for global foreign policy, as it involves Russia – a nuclear great power – facing off against Ukraine, backed by NATO, the strongest military alliance. This precarious situation raises fears of escalation into a third world war.

While it is clear that Russia must be stopped and Ukraine supported, the conflict presents a delicate balancing act: Escalation must be avoided, particularly given Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats (Gabuev 2024), yet Ukraine cannot fall, as it is fighting Russia on behalf of the broader international community and shielding Europe from Putin's imperialistic ambitions. The international community thus faces the challenge of aiding Ukraine without provoking further aggression from Russia, carefully navigating the fine line between firm pressure and avoiding overreach.

The US has played a leading role in the international response to the war in Ukraine through the provision of extensive military assistance, humanitarian aid and budgetary support, alongside enacting sanctions on Russia. US aid is the largest among Ukraine's allies, with over 56.8€ billion in military assistance between 2022 and 2024, compared to Germany’s 10.63€ billion and the UK’s 9.42€ billion. Overall, US and EU institutions are the top two donors, with the EU contributing over 118.23€ billion in total aid and the US providing more than 84.73€ billion (Trebesch et al. 2024). Should US support wane, it is questionable whether the European allies alone can sustain the same level of assistance to Ukraine. However, US support for Ukraine has historically received bipartisan backing, which may provide stability in US foreign policy amid electoral changes. Nevertheless, the election outcome is immensely important for the future of Ukraine, European security and the broader balance of global power.

Given these high stakes, the election initially appeared unusually chaotic, with two of the oldest candidates in US history – Joe Biden and Donald Trump – facing off against each other. Biden’s eventual withdrawal due to health issues paved the way for Kamala Harris, presenting a clearer choice between continuity and unpredictability.

Plausible scenarios and current policy options

Scenario 1: Continuity under Kamala Harris

Kamala Harris, continuing in the footsteps of the Biden administration, would likely maintain the current US strategy of robust support for Ukraine, including sustained military aid, humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and stringent sanctions against Russia. Harris’s election would likely reassure European partners, reinforcing a unified front against Russian aggression and enhancing aid effectiveness. In the best case, it would also advance the control and investigation of export sanction violations involving critical military components sent to Russia. Agencies such as the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) would play a key role. Enhanced efforts could significantly reduce Russia's access to Western military-grade components and systems that fuel its war machine (Byrne et al. 2022), potentially leading to negotiations or a cessation of hostilities.

Currently, US authorities investigate military smuggling, but these cases remain rare. Investigations require examining the entire supply chain to prove that dual-use goods from the US end up in Russian defence enterprises like Rostec and Almaz-Antey (see e.g. United States District Court Eastern District of New York 2023, United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York 2023, United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York 2023). Although there are about 20 ongoing smuggling cases, the actual number of violations is much higher. Exports from the Common High Priority (CHP) list – covering sensitive dual-use technologies – often go unpunished due to the difficulty of proving military use, which takes time to establish. Consequently, dual-use goods worth hundreds of millions of dollars continue to enter Russia despite the sanction regime's absolute prohibition (Zayakin and Lyndell 2024).

Scenario 2: Uncertainty under Donald Trump

Donald Trump's candidacy creates uncertainty for US support of Ukraine. His past statements, including praise for Putin and scepticism toward NATO, raise concerns about reduced US aid to Ukraine and a rollback of sanctions. Trump has expressed a desire to negotiate a settlement between Ukraine and Russia immediately after being elected, claiming he could "end the war within 24 hours". Yet his reluctance to clearly support Ukraine’s victory suggests he may not challenge Russia’s expansionism. Instead, he might push Ukraine to cede occupied territories to Russia while reducing US support. This approach risks repeating the 2014 scenario, when concessions to Putin emboldened further aggression.

In this scenario, strategic planning is essential to mitigate reductions in aid and adjust transatlantic policies while upholding key non-negotiables. For the EU, this could be a turning point, allowing it to shift from being a passive follower of US policy to a global power that shapes its own course – possibly standing with Ukraine even if Trump attempts to pressure Ukraine to relinquish its territory. Independent aid to Ukraine is crucial. The prospect of diminished US leadership may seem daunting; however, Russia poses a direct threat to Europe, not to the United States. As empires fall, it may be time to embrace a new global leader in the face of the EU. Even if Trump lifted all US sanctions in one day, it might inspire the EU and its Member States to stand united, tightening controls on military component exports to Russia and preventing violations. This approach would increase the impact of aid to Ukraine – not simply by providing Ukraine with more weapons, but also by ensuring that Russia does not gain access to additional arms. At present, these measures are ineffective, allowing European companies to send dual-use goods to Russia with impunity (Juknevičiūtė 2024). The flow of critical military technology to Russia enables it to sustain and escalate the conflict. This arms flow to both sides diminishes the overall impact of international actors' support for Ukraine.

Policy recommendations

To ensure the continuity of support for Ukraine regardless of the US election outcome, transatlantic policymakers must prepare now to secure a stable, long-term framework for aiding Ukraine. 

Recommendation 1: Enhance transatlantic cooperation and aid effectiveness

If Kamala Harris wins, transatlantic policymakers should continue coordinating with the US administration to bolster sanctions, increase military, humanitarian and financial aid to Ukraine and focus on halting Russia’s aggression.

• Increase financial commitments to Ukraine: Transatlantic policymakers must ensure the EU and other international actors take on a larger share of the burden, especially if US support falters due to a potential Republican-controlled Congress that might block aid packages to Ukraine. One avenue for the EU could involve expanding the use of frozen Russian state and sanctioned individuals' assets. While the Council of the EU has approved using proceeds from the Russian Central Bank’s frozen assets to aid Ukraine, this could include funds from sanctioned entities and individuals, making Russia’s wealth part of the solution to its own aggression without straining the European budget.

Recommendation 2: Prepare contingency plans for a potential Trump presidency

If Donald Trump wins, international actors should develop strategies to mitigate potential reductions in US support and ensure continuity in aid and sanctions enforcement.

• Reduce reliance on US leadership and increase commitments to Ukraine: European allies should collaborate through the European Defence Agency with NATO to build independent defence capabilities. Currently, 63 per cent of EU defence orders go to US companies, undermining Europe’s strategic autonomy. Europe must prioritise joint military projects and increase investment in its defence industry, which currently spends only €10.7 billion (4.5 per cent of total expenditures) on defence research and development compared to the US's €130 billion (Draghi 2024). This underinvestment limits Europe's ability to support Ukraine amid Russian aggression. Additionally, leveraging frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s aid and post-war recovery should be a key EU strategy.
• Strengthen EU leadership: Reducing reliance on the US may necessitate more assertive actions from key EU leaders, including President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen, Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas and European Council President António Costa. Engaging with both Republican and Democratic legislators is essential for fostering a unified approach to support Ukraine, especially if Trump advocates for withdrawal or reduced aid. Additionally, establishing structured dialogues with non-EU Eastern European countries and the Caucasus region will enhance regional security and facilitate the creation of collective defence mechanisms against Russian aggression, promoting stability in areas directly threatened by Russia.

Recommendation 3: Promote a unified front and regional stabilisation
Irrespective of who wins:

• Coordination on sanctions enforcement: Transatlantic allies should strengthen cooperation to improve the enforcement of sanctions, particularly regarding the export of critical military components to Russia. This would involve enhanced intelligence sharing, harmonising sanctions policies, prosecuting violators and closing existing loopholes. Establishing a proactive EU authority dedicated to monitoring sanctions enforcement could improve coordination with US agencies like the BIS, OFAC, DDTC, CBP, etc. Such an authority would also compel Member States to act when necessary, preventing reliance on US agencies to lead enforcement efforts in Europe, as has occurred when the FBI seized Russian assets in Spain (Jolly 2022) or when US sanctions prompted Cyprus to act against Russian oli-garch enablers (Klein 2023).
• Develop a long-term strategy for Ukraine: Regardless of the election outcome, the EU Council for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service should engage with Ukraine’s government – specifically the Office of the President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – alongside international partners such as the US Secretary of State and the National Security Council to explore avenues for negotiating peace with Russia while clearly defining Ukraine's key non-negotiables that are to be respected, including possibly the restoration of its borders to their internationally recognised status from the 1990s. By adhering to these principles and involving key diplomatic actors, the prospect of achieving a lasting ceasefire and the possibility of waking up in a peaceful world becomes more attainable.

Ultimately, the 2024 US election will do more than just determine the next president – it will set the trajectory for global policy on Ukraine and significantly influence the broader quest for stability and peace. Whether there is a steady continuation of support under Kamala Harris or a wildcard shift in strategy under Donald Trump, the stakes are high, and the decisions made will resonate far beyond America’s borders. In this battle beyond the ballot, only time will tell if US support for Ukraine will stay the course or take an unpredictable turn – and whether the EU will rise to fill any potential leadership void. The outcome will not only impact the ongoing conflict but also shape global stability and peace-building efforts for years to come. 

Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.

References

Bomprezzi,Pietro; Kharitonov, Ivan, Trebesch, Christoph (2024): Ukraine Support Tracker  A Data-base of Military, Financial and Humanitarian Aid to Ukraine Update October 10, 2024: Data until August 31st 2024, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/ (accessed on October 23, 2024).

Byrne, James; Somerville, Gary; Byrne, Joe; Watling, Jack; Reynolds, Nick, and Baker, Jane (2022). (August, 2022) Silicon Lifeline: Western Electronics at the Heart of Russia’s War Machine. RUSI. static.rusi.org/RUSI-Silicon-Lifeline-final-updated-web_1.pdf (accessed on October 23, 2024).

Draghi, Mario (2024): Report: The future of European competitiveness. A competitiveness strategy for Europe, European Commision, commission.europa.eu/document/download/97e481fd-2dc3-412d-be4c-f152a8232961_en (accessed on October 23, 2024).

Gabuev, Alexander (2024): How Serious a Threat Is Russia’s New Nuclear Doctrine?, CARNEGIE POLITIKA,https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/09/russia-nuclear-doctrine-blackmail?lang=en (accessed on October 3, 2024)

Jolly, Jasper (2022): Spanish police and FBI seize superyacht in Mallorca linked to Putin ally, The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/04/spanish-police-and-fbi-seize-superyacht-in-mallorca-linked-to-putin-ally (accessed on October 23, 2024).

Juknevičiūtė, Rūta (2024): Lithuania is a gateway for sanctioned shipments to Russia – LRT Inves-tigation, LRT/.It english, www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/2263805/lithuania-is-a-gateway-for-sanctioned-shipments-to-russia-lrt-investigation (accessed on October 23, 2024).

Klein, David (2023): Cyprus Bracing for More Sanctions in Response to Enforcement Failures, OCCRP. www.occrp.org/en/news/cyprus-bracing-for-more-sanctions-in-response-to-enforcement-failures (accessed on October 23, 2024).

United States District Court Eastern District of New York (2023): United States of America against Nikolay Goltsev, Salimdzhon Nasriddinov and Kristina Puzyreva, www.justice.gov/opa/media/1322456/dl= (accessed on October 23, 2024).

United States District Court for the District of Columbia (2024): United States v. Denis Postovoy, www.justice.gov/d9/2024-09/postovoy_indictment.pdf (accessed on October 23, 2024).

United States Magistrate Judge Southern District of New York (2023): United States of America v. Maxim Marchenko, www.justice.gov/opa/file/1314751/dl (accessed on October 23, 2024)

Zayakin, Andrey, and Lyndell, Dada (2024): Poor man’s lend-lease: Russia continues to import U.S. microchips needed for missile navigation and Internet censorship despite sanctions, The In-sider, theins.ru/en/society/274083 (accessed on October 23, 2024).

Prospects for an end to the Russian-Ukrainian war post-US elections 2024

Dr. Alina Nychyk – Researcher at Zurich University of Applied Sciences

The Russian-Ukrainian war has been deteriorating security on the European continent for over 10 years. Russia cannot be allowed to win, since this would irreversibly damage international law and give incentives for other aggressors. The 2024 US presidential elections could lead to tougher policy against Russia and more support for Ukraine or an appeasement of Putin. Yet both Trump’s and Harris’s attitudes toward the war are not fully clear. With the uncertainty surrounding future US policy, European policymakers should develop closer cooperation in security, increase their own military production, increase financial and military support to Ukraine (provide weapons from its own stocks) and give full permission to Ukraine to use any weapons on Russian territory. 

In this policy paper, I discuss the prospects for peace in the Russian-Ukrainian war after the 2024 US presidential elections. I examine the current discussions within US political parties and build scenarios for what the victory of each of the candidates would mean for the possibility of peace. In conclusion, I offer several policy recommendations on how Ukraine’s victory may be achieved.

Introduction

Over the last decades, the US as the perceived “policeman of the world” has had a substantial impact on world politics. More than two and a half years of the Russian-Ukrainian full-scale war has shown that the US position – punishment of Russia and support for Ukraine – is crucial both for the development of the war and other countries’ attitudes towards it. For instance, the US had provided 38 per cent of the overall assistance to Ukraine (including almost 50 per cent of military aid) during two and a half years of the invasion (Trebesch, Bomprezzi, and Kharitonov 2024). It can be said, then, that if European countries are not able to hugely increase their assistance to Ukraine and/or Russia’s supporters, mainly China, India, Iran and North Korea, do not cease their help for Russia, the US position will stay crucial for the outcome of the war.

Ukraine’s victory and Russia’s defeat is of crucial importance both for stability in Europe and the triumph of international law, which Russia flagrantly broke in a number of ways. A Russian victory would give incentives for other countries to abuse their power and to disregard international rules as well. For example, China is closely following the Western response to Russian aggression and may take lessons for its future actions toward Taiwan.

To be able to win against a stronger Russia, Ukraine requires even more support from its partners. The months-long delay of support from the United States, which was held up in Congress, deteriorated the situation on the frontline and cost thousands of Ukrainian lives. The US could have helped Ukraine even more, e.g. via more financial assistance, delivery of different kinds of weapons and the lifting of restrictions on attacking Russian territory. The change in power after the US presidential election will have an impact on the amount of US support for Ukraine and on how fast peace can be achieved. 

Anticipated scenario in the case of a Harris victory 
Since Democratic presidential candidate Kamala Harris has been vice president to Joe Biden and has confirmed her favourable stance towards Ukraine, Harris is expected to continue US support for Ukraine. Yet Biden’s involvement in this war was widely criticised as being too slow and indecisive. Some even argue that the US “gives the Ukrainian people just enough military aid not to lose their war but not enough to win it” (Marlantes and Ackerman 2024). In her speeches, Harris promises “to stand strong with Ukraine and NATO allies” (Powell 2024), she met with Zelensky on a number of occasions and represented the US during the Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland. Analyst Anders Åslund argues that Harris has an opportunity to take a stronger position on the war and support for Ukraine by providing much more financial (by also using frozen Russian reserves) and military assistance (via more sophisticated weapons) and by allowing Ukraine to use US weapons to strike Russian territory (Åslund 2024). On the other hand, having a Republican Congress during a Harris presidency may also complicate US support for Ukraine. Thus, the one scenario is that a Harris administration continues the US’s previous stance on the Russian-Ukrainian war and possibly even increases US support, despite Republican opposition in Congress.

Anticipated scenario in the case of a Trump victory 
Many see Trump’s possible victory as a major challenge for the transatlantic partnership. Although there are many speculations about Trump’s policy towards the Russian-Ukrainian war, Trump has not laid out any consistent strategy “to end the war in 24 hours” (as he promised on a number of occasions). The plan that was given to Trump by his senior advisors included forcing both the Ukrainian and the Russian side to peace talks: if Ukraine refuses, US help would be stopped; if Russia refuses, the US would give Ukraine even more military support to resist Russia (Slattery and Lewis 2024). Ukrainian officials have assessed that Trump may want to reboot relations with Russia first, but later would realise the impossibility of trusting Putin. Additionally, Trump’s voters would also understand that the weapons production for Ukraine is beneficial to the US (Podat’ 2024). In one of his latest interviews, Trump guaranteed to end the war quickly, but refused to share any concrete plans, since that might undermine his plan’s success (Fridman 2024). Furthermore, he also suggested that he would decrease oil prices by two times or more and “Putin would not be able to fight this war with oil for $50” (Karbunar 2024).

In one possible scenario, Trump pushes Ukraine to hold talks with Russia and to painful compromises, e.g. to abandon its occupied territories to Russia and to forget about its aspirations for NATO membership. In another possible scenario, Trump is less cautious and bureaucratic than Biden, allowing Ukraine to attack Russia on its territory and deliver all the needed weapons quicker. He also uses his relationship to put pressure on Putin to end the war. 

In a scenario in which Trump stops all support for Ukraine on the first day of his presidency, Ukraine will be faced with a lack of weapons, ammunition and finances to fight against Russia. The situation will become critical after several weeks or months. Seeing the US withdraw from the war, Russia will feel empowered. The outcome could be either Ukraine’s total mobilisation (more soldiers, more military production – all of this will just buy them a bit more time) and/or full European involvement (more financial and military support, possibly more diplomatic pressure on Putin) or Russian victory in one way or another (occupation of parts or the whole of the country). What speaks against this scenario is that the US still feels a certain responsibility for peace in Europe, the American public is still in favour of supporting Ukraine and Ukrainians are still determined to resist Russia. Thus, withdrawal from Ukraine as from Afghanistan is not currently a viable option for the US. 

Recommendations if Harris wins

Harris’s victory would probably continue the US commitment to security in Europe and to supporting Ukraine against Russia. In this vein, transatlantic policymakers should invest in building mutual trust, cooperation and a common peaceful vision of the future. The US will most likely remain a leader in supporting Ukraine, but each country could still implement individual policies, e.g. regarding the permission to Ukraine to attack Russian territory. However, the Republican-controlled Congress may decrease or delay US support for Ukraine. In this case, Democrats should look for compromises with Republicans to maintain US support. During this process, European policymakers should take up a bigger role in providing for security in Europe. The below recommendations in case of a Trump victory can also be implemented by European decision-makers with Harris in office – even with the presence of the US as “big brother”, there is no harm in building a stronger, more self-reliant Europe.

Recommendations if Trump wins
Trump’s possible victory is often viewed as a threat to transatlantic unity. Yet, this may be a chance as well – a chance for Europe to become more self-reliant and united. The European defence industry needs to increase its production to sustain security in Europe and this security starts with Ukraine. Yet, the effects of an increase in military production will only be felt in the years to come. Currently, European countries should provide Ukraine with weapons that they already have in their stockpiles. Secondly, European countries should permit Ukraine to use the delivered weapons on Russian territory. 

The third thing European decision-makers should implement is the total economic isolation of Russia. Last year, all EU countries’ imports from Russia amounted to around €50 billion (Eurostat 2024). The EU received 15 per cent of its gas supplies from Russia (Sullivan 2024). The EU has managed to decrease this amount after Russia’s attack on Ukraine, but there is no need to wait until the target year of 2027 to end all gas imports from Russia. Since the EU Energy Commissioner recently said the EU could manage without Russian gas (Fox 2024), it should do so. The EU can get everything from its more reliable and friendly partners and Russia will have less money for its war against Ukraine. Let us remember that one of the core reasons for the USSR’s collapse was its economic isolation. Thus, Euro-Atlantic decision-makers should do everything to stop their own countries’ trade with Russia and to convince others, e.g. China (though unlikely to be persuaded), Brazil and India, to do so as well.

Apart from the above, the EU countries bordering Ukraine could start protecting Ukrainian civilians and shooting down Russian drones and missiles over Ukraine either from their own territory or via entering Ukrainian airspace with their planes. Such discussions have been ongoing for quite a while and recently Poland offered to do this if Russia was to attack Ukraine’s nuclear plants (Shevko 2024). Western countries shoot missiles and drones over Israel and can do this over Ukraine (they would be shooting the same Iranian Shahed drones). 

With future US policy towards Europe remaining uncertain, Europe should get prepared for any scenario and become a guardian of its own security. There may be certain opposition within the EU, e.g. from Hungary, which would require EU policymakers to search for new approaches in its foreign policy decision-making. When Putin feels Europe’s and Ukraine’s strength and understands that his blackmail does not work, he will be forced to end his unjust war rather sooner than later.

Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.

References

Åslund, Anders (2024): Kamala Harris Must Correct US Ukraine Policy, Project Syndicate, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/kamala-harris-ukraine-war-policy-correcting-biden-administration-mistakes-by-anders-aslund-2024-08 (accessed on September 6, 2024).

Fridman, Lex (2024): Transcript for Donald Trump Interview | Lex Fridman Podcast #442, lexfridman.com, lexfridman.com/donald-trump-transcript/ (accessed on September 6, 2024)

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