The US election takes place in the context of eroding multilateral cooperation. In the UN, this trend is linked to growing geopolitical competition between major powers, diverging interests of countries of the Global North and South or the crisis of the UN’s traditional tools, such as peacekeeping operations. A Republican administration will likely present a further challenge.
How can the UN be made fit to deal with future crises of international peace and security and what future form of peace operations is both possible and desirable?
Prithvi Gupta is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation, India.
In 2024, close to 49 per cent of the world’s population will head to the polls in over 60 countries (and the EU), the results of which will be consequential for years to come (Ewe 2023). These votes come amidst global economic strife, geopolitical contestation, increased cost of living and global defence expenditure, and rising tensions in international security, all of which threaten to upend the post-1945 liberal international order.
While elections across all 64 countries are vital to the international community, the elections in the US can be touted as being “first among equals” as far as multilateralism, global politics and international security are concerned. The 2024 US presidential election, which will elect the 48th President of the US, has captured much of the imagination of policymakers across the world, ranging from the Indo-Pacific to the Med-Atlantic.
Setting the stage
Policymakers across the world have deliberated about what a second Trump presidency might bring to the global high table or what an administration led by Kamala Harris may look like (Subramanian and Debusmann 2024).
For most countries around the globe, the possible Republican and Democratic administrations bring distinct futures. The Democratic Party believes in the US-led international order and the US’s continued role in preserving and upholding the post-1945 liberal world order (Pike et al. 2024). Biden's internationalism in the past four years shifted American foreign policy from international military interventions to active diplomacy backed by American strength. Kamala Harris intends to continue the US’s leadership role by “standing with allies, standing up to dictators, and leading on the world stage” in a “New Way Forward” for American foreign policy in a multipolar world (The New York Times 2024).
On the other hand, the Republican agenda leans heavily towards American isolationism, pragmatic realism and a reductionist version of erstwhile Republican president Ronald Reagan’s “peace through strength” doctrine. In their election bid this year, the Republican ticket championed more realist foreign policy principles through espousing protectionist trade policies, negligence of the US’s transatlantic security partnership and open criticism of the UN’s functionality in the international community and the alleged benefits of globalism and globalisation (Walt 2021; O’Brien 2024; Nagy and Nagao 2024).
The US, the UN and the Summit of the Future
The US has been the mainstay of the UN ever since its establishment in 1945 (Whineray 2020). Consequently, policy toward the UN has also been a cornerstone of American foreign policy. The US has greatly benefitted from exercising soft power diplomacy at the UN in building international consensus for its many international interventions—military and economic. Ratified UNSC resolutions command the respect of governments and citizens worldwide. UNSC resolutions are legally enforceable on all member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. As the preeminent institution of multilateralism, there is also legitimacy that the UN confers on any UNSC decree passed or resolution adopted because of its wide membership and inclusivity. For instance, the US pursued the First Gulf War with UN support, rallying nations to its cause in the UN General Assembly and the UNSC. A more recent instance is the adoption of Resolution 2702 in 2023 , which extended the UNSMIL by a year in Libya (United Nations Security Council 2023).
However, four fundamental factors are driving changes in this partnership—the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas war, the US presidential elections and the Russia-China axis in the UN. As the US Ambassador to the UN rallies nations to alienate Russia for its war on Ukraine, she stands almost alone in defending Israel against condemnations of its onslaught on civilians and destruction of social infrastructure in the Gaza Strip. In the UNSC, the Russia-China axis has ossified the UN's power centre for maintaining international security. The US-UN relationship also faces uncertainty stemming from the US’s upcoming presidential election.
In the case of a Republican victory, were the US to turn into a great power that is isolationist and protectionist, it would serve the UN and the global multilateral architecture disastrously, for the US has been the mainstay of the modern global multilateral architecture.
In this pivotal moment, the UN held its Summit of the Future between 21-23 September 2024. The overarching agenda of the Summit was to reform multilateralism and global governance architecture, as well as reaffirm the international community’s commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals. The Pact for the Future, adopted by the UN General Assembly in its 79th session during the Summit, was passed by a record vote of 143 in favour to 7 against (Belarus, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Sudan, Syria), with 15 abstentions (Wintour 2024). Actions 39 and 40 therein cover UNSC reforms, which, while ambitious, fall short of actionable steps on UNSC reforms. The Pact does little more than lip service to expanding regional and sub-regional representation, the UNSC’s permanent and non-permanent seats and the Global South’s role in multilateral decision-making. Lack of clarity on text-based negotiations, timeframes for UNSC reforms and disagreement among member states over the desired degree of reforms to the current system were major hurdles. Yet it was a step in the right direction because the Pact recognised the historical injustices against Africa, the need for veto reform (a first) and the inclusion of a “review” clause on UNSC decisions.
Future-proofing the UN in 2024
For transatlantic policymakers, the UNSC reforms have regained relevance since the war in Ukraine and the Israel-Hamas conflict, especially now that the Iran-Israel rivalry threatens to destabilise a region critical for transatlantic energy security and trade. The US elections may bring an administration that will not view the US’s role in the UN favourably and isolate Washington from the UN’s international peace and security initiatives and reforms. Yet there is bipartisan consensus in the US pertaining to certain UNSC reforms that favour US foreign policy. European and US policymakers should be focusing on these consensus reforms while coordinating reform, as they serve the US and Europe’s own interests and foreign policy goals.
Conclusion
The two reforms mentioned above have bipartisan consensus in the US, as African countries and India have become major partners of the US for different reasons. The EU and Europe’s permanent members in the UNSC have also thrown their weight behind India’s inclusion in the UNSC and Africa’s increased permanent representation in the UNSC (which was also mentioned in the Pact for the Future). Seeing these reforms through would serve many purposes for Med-Atlantic policymakers: countering the China-Russia axis in the UN and their burgeoning influence in the Global South, consolidating the transatlantic pivot to Asia (which Europe has been failing at compared with the US) and shedding the burden of colonialism which many Western countries bear and which has hindered East-West cooperation to varying degrees in the 21st century. More importantly, the expansion of the UNSC membership would maintain the relevance of the UN and restore faith globally in the UNSC and the international peace and security functions of the UN by making it more representative and adapting it to the current realities of the international community—economically and geopolitically. These reforms can be a major step in reversing the ongoing ossification of the UNSC and UN system at large which the world is currently witnessing.
Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
References
Bhomick, Soumya (2023): Margins to centre: AU in the G20 (+1), Observer Research Foundation, www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/margins-to-centre-au-in-the-g20-1, (Accessed October 9, 2024).
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Kirsten Hartmann is a Research Assistant at the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung (BKHS)
The 2024 US election will intensify the crisis of UN peace operations. Under both administrations, European policymakers should no longer rely on the US in UN missions, but develop a more strategic approach to strengthen peace operations. If Trump wins, political disengagement and funding cuts will undermine existing missions and weaken UN peace operations in the future. If Harris wins, her constructive approach will be jeopardised by congressional opposition which will feed into the gradual decline of US leadership on UN missions.
Irrespective of the outcome, the 2024 US presidential election will have global repercussions. It will crucially affect the UN as the central multilateral forum as well as its most visible tool: peace operations (UN peacekeeping operations and special political missions). US engagement in UN missions is wide-ranging: it is the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping with a budget share of 26.94 per cent, has political influence as a permanent UN Security Council (UNSC) member and provides support to missions as well as training and equipment to troop and police contributing countries (T/PCCs). UN peace operations are currently in crisis and face several challenges, including liquidity shortfalls, a gridlocked UNSC and a changing conflict and security actor landscape. In the face of increasing conflicts worldwide, they must adapt to a shifting environment. Given the major role of the US in UN missions, the election will significantly shape their development.
This policy brief introduces two scenarios of how the next US administration under Republican Donald Trump or Democrat Kamala Harris will affect the trajectory of UN peace operations and offers recommendations for European and US policymakers. It builds on extensive literature research and 24 qualitative research interviews and background conversations with a diverse range of international stakeholders that took place between June and September 2024.
Trump 2.0: “Unmitigated disaster” (INT-08)?
During his first term, Trump pushed for budget reductions of UN peace operations and withheld approved funds. Since 2017, after years of waivers, Congress has enforced the 25 per cent cap on UN peacekeeping funding, resulting in over $1.1 billion in arrears that hamper missions’ work (Blanchfield 2024; Williams 2018). This contributes to a vicious cycle weakening missions’ relevance: less funding leads to less effective operations, which backs the argument that they are overall less effective and should be downsized or withdrawn (INT-11). European states have failed to call out the US for its underpayment or to counter the questioning of missions’ effectiveness aimed at cutting their budgets during the Trump administration. The strong rhetorical support for UN peace operations among UN member states does not translate into implementing necessary reforms and providing sufficient resources. Since Trump’s last term, the Russian war against Ukraine and the war in the Middle East have increased UNSC tensions and have led to more non-unanimous mandate renewals, which jeopardise mandate implementation (INT-06).
Under a Trump 2.0 scenario, his anti-multilateral “America First” policy will undermine UN peace operations financially and politically. Alongside rising Republican anti-UN sentiment, he will call for cutting (or even eliminating) funding to UN peacekeeping and related US measures (INT-11; INT-21). His close relationship with Putin and decreasing Ukraine support could (setting aside the severe effects for Ukraine) improve US-Russian Council relations (Gowan 2024). Yet, his Middle East policy and aggressive stance against China could increase UNSC tensions that prevent agreement on existing or new missions. Costly and longstanding missions will face growing pressure, for instance to reduce expensive items like aviation, and the US will prevent any increases of the peacekeeping budget (INT-19; INT-20). Yet, a pragmatic Trump administration would not veto existing missions, as they are low on the agenda, relatively cost-effective and contribute to US global standing (INT-18; INT-21). But increasing efforts to streamline missions could lead to rapid downsizing or transitions. While overinflated missions do exist, withdrawal procedures need to be in place to not risk undoing the successes of previous measures (INT-11). Tasks that are cut in missions would also be shifted to parts of the UN system that mainly depend on voluntary funding. A lack of US political backing for missions under Trump 2.0 could jeopardise mandate implementation. Rhetorical attacks on human rights and gender would strengthen China’s and Russia’s pushback on these topics and result in watered-down language in mandates (INT-21; INT-22).
US (dis-)engagement on UN missions under Trump 2.0 is determined by people in key positions (INT-21). He will rely on loyalists to avoid building up someone like Nikki Haley who ended up running against him for the Republican presidential nomination (INT-11). UN peace operations will not be of interest for Trumpists installed in the National Security Council, the State Department and as UN ambassador, which could lead to US political disengagement from existing missions and reform efforts. The US will work less closely with partners and be more isolated in mandate discussions.
With the declining relevance of UN missions, UN partnerships with (sub-)regional actors have become more important, particularly on the African continent. African states claim more national and regional ownership in peace and security issues. US support to implement Resolution 2719 – adopted in 2023 after long US opposition to financing African Union (AU)-led peace support operations with UN money – will diminish as Trump is unwilling to fund the UN, “let alone give money to the UN to give to somebody else” (INT-08). As congressional approval is necessary for each case the Resolution applies to, Congress could delay (or even halt) the process (INT-15). This would damage US relations with African UNSC members and weaken the UN-AU peace and security partnership. In sum, Trump 2.0 would undermine existing UN peace operations and weaken the tool in the future.
Harris 1.0: Continued support despite internal backlash?
While her multilateral priorities are still unclear, Harris built up her foreign policy profile during her vice presidency and expressed support for multilateralism, including at multiple Munich Security Conferences. A Harris 1.0 scenario will largely mean a continuation of Biden’s approach to UN missions. She will propose to fully finance them and pay back US arrears. However, if Congress withholds money – particularly when under Republican control but also possibly under Democratic control –, the US will fail to meet its peacekeeping obligations (INT-21). Given her focus on domestic priorities, Harris will be unable to push through the money and continued US underpayments will undermine missions’ work.
Harris will continue Biden’s non-engagement-policy with Russia (Bazail-Eimil et al. 2024). While publicly pursuing a hard stance against China, Harris could pursue a “nuanced and sophisticated approach” on the working level and seek consensus with China on certain missions (INT-21; INT-22). The US will continue to support the multidimensional mission model despite increasing pushback. The Harris administration will act as a constructive partner in, but not lead, discussions on future UN missions. Harris will build on Biden’s outreach to Africa to counter Russian and Chinese influence and seek stronger alliances with African UNSC members (also to receive their support in mandate negotiations). She will support Resolution 2719 politically, but Congress could delay its implementation. Harris’s foreign policy advisors and the new UN ambassador could shift the US focus from an African emphasis in UN peace operations under the current ambassador to other regions, such as the Middle East. This would weaken US relations to African UNSC members and the AU. In sum, Harris’s constructive approach could be jeopardised by Congress, which adds to the gradual decline of US leadership on UN peace operations.
Continuity in US-UN policy
Some elements are similar in each scenario. US underpayment to peacekeeping will remain. While Trump and Harris will differ in rhetoric, both will push for more cost-effective missions. This feeds into overall shifts from large multidimensional peacekeeping operations to smaller, cheaper missions, including special political missions. Their approach to missions in contexts that are less geopolitically contested or less important for US security interests, such as Cyprus, will be similar. While countering growing Chinese influence in peacekeeping – China is the P5’s largest troop contributor and second largest donor – unites both parties, the “need for consensus with China will grow” (INT-22) for any future US president.
How to prepare for US disengagement?
In both scenarios, European policymakers must prepare for (different levels of) US disengagement from UN peace operations and develop a more strategic approach to support the tool. As US underpayment continues, European states must pay their full dues on time and intensify public and diplomatic pressure on the US to do the same. They must identify ways to better balance mission funding, explore accountability measures for underpayment and revive previous efforts to reform the financing of peace operations, including in the C34 Committee. European policymakers must critically reflect on their role and responsibility in UN peace operations. Most peacekeepers are currently deployed by states from the Global South (and partly lack adequate equipment and training) (UN Peacekeeping 2024). European states like Germany should deploy more personnel, provide more needed material contributions (e.g. technological) to missions and equipment to other T/PCCs, and ensure that trainings provide relevant capacities (INT-08; Boutellis and Beary 2020). European policymakers need to walk the talk on their rhetorical commitments to UN missions. They must shift their approach from offering background support to proactively shaping the future of UN peace operations. More effective UN missions are in Europe’s selfinterest: national and regional security in Europe is connected with security and stability abroad.
European policymakers should fill the gap left by declining US political leadership on UN missions. If Trump wins, European permanent and elected council members must push for the implementation of Resolution 2719 – ensuring African agency and addressing existing pitfalls. Diplomats should avoid making the resolution palatable to Trump by “pitching” militarised AU operations as a counterterrorism tool “to reduce the US burden in Africa” (INT-15). European policymakers should support the ca-pacity-building of (sub-)regional actors in the field of peace operations at the UN and bilateral level. They must increase confidence in UN missions, including through communicating current successes. Improving the political and public perception of missions is also important at home to legitimise increased support while the focus shifts to national and territorial defence. Ahead of the 2025 Peace-keeping Ministerial organised by Germany, European policymakers must facilitate consensus across broad North-South alliances on the role of UN peace operations and provide new impetus for feasible mission models and reform implementation – with US support under Harris and without it under Trump. They could also promote a stronger role for the General Assembly in peace and security issues.
To counter increased Republican pushes to defund the UN, US policymakers need to underscore UN missions’ importance and the costs of disengagement for US national security interests. American funding of UN missions is a relatively small sum compared to total US defence spending and it is cost-effective: financing UN missions is eight times cheaper for American taxpayers than deploying US forces (Better World Campaign 2024; US GAO 2018). US withdrawal from UN peace operations reduces its influence and encourages other powers, particularly China, to fill the vacuum. Yet, rather than escalating UNSC tensions, US diplomats should seek constructive discussions with China on future UN missions – there is simply “no way around China” (INT-21). They should not confuse simply cheaper with more efficient and effective missions and ensure that context-specific needs determine the UN’s response to conflicts. US policymakers must support African agency in peace operations in the UNSC and by strengthening the relevant capacities of (sub-)regional organisations. In the context of the highest number of active conflicts since the Second World War, European and US policymakers must strengthen UN missions to prevent their further loss of relevance.
Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
References
Bazail-Eimil, Eric; Gould, Joe; Herszenhorn, Miles J. and Kine, Phelim (2024): What a Kamala Harris foreign policy could look like, Politico, www.politico.com/news/2024/07/21/kamala-harris-foreign-policy-00170143 (accessed on September 5, 2024 ).
Better World Campaign (2024): U.S. Funding for the UN, betterworldcampaign.org/us-funding-for-the-un (accessed on September 11, 2024).
Blanchfield, Luisa (2024): United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding of U.N. Peacekeeping, Congressional Research Service, crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10354 (accessed on September 6, 2024).
Boutellis, Arthur and Beary, Michael (2020): Sharing the Burden: Lessons from the European Return to Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping, International Peace Institute.
Gowan, Richard (2024): The UN Security Council in the New Era of Great Power Competition, International Crisis Group, www.crisisgroup.org/global/un-security-council-new-era-great-power-competition (accessed on August 22, 2024).
United Nations Peacekeeping (2024): Troop and Police Contributors, peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors (accessed on October 21, 2024).
United States Government Accountability Office (US GAO) (2018): UN Peacekeeping: Cost Estimate for Hypo-thetical U.S. Operation Exceeds Actual Costs for Comparable UN Operation.
Williams, Paul D. (2018): In US Failure to Pay Peacekeeping Bills, Larger UN Financing Questions Raised, IPI Global Observatory, theglobalobservatory.org/2018/10/in-us-failure-pay-peacekeeping-bills-larger-financing-questions-raised/ (accessed on September 10, 2024).
Interview references used in the text:
Interview with INT-06, researcher at a think tank, 27.06.2024.
Interview with INT-08, researcher, 28.06.2024.
Interview with INT-10, researcher, 02.07.2024.
Interview with INT-11, policy analyst at a think tank, 03.07.2024.
Interview with INT-15, expert at an international NGO, 12.07.2024.
Interview with INT-18, researcher, 01.08.2024.
Interview with INT-19, expert at an NGO, 12.08.2024.
Interview with INT-20, researcher, 22.08.2024.
Interview with INT-21, president of an advocacy organisation, 10.09.2024.
Interview with INT-22, programme director at an advocacy organisation, 10.09.2024.
Flávia Oliveira Ribeiro is a Research Assistant and PhD Candidate at the Academy for European Human Rights Protection at the University of Cologne, Germany.
The outcome of the election is critical for global migration governance and the UN's ability to protect migrants. The US plays a key role through its financial support and influence on others countries’ migration policies. In the event of a Democratic victory, transatlantic policymakers should focus on strengthening EU-US relations through concrete policy coordination and working with UNHCR and IOM to reform aspects of migration. In the case of a Republican victory, they should focus on strengthening EU regional cooperation on migration, while ensuring stronger cooperation with the UN and creating contingency funds to support UNHCR and IOM.
Introduction
This policy brief addresses the need to increase humanitarian assistance, end harmful practices and ensure adequate funding and resources to protect migrants. For the purpose of this policy brief, “migrants” includes refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, economic migrants and those displaced by climate change. This brief explores how transatlantic policymakers can enhance the UN’s ability to protect these populations dependant on the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election.
The UN’s effectiveness in protecting migrants has historically been influenced by US politics given its status as the largest financial contributor. The outcome of the upcoming elections could lead to significantly different approaches to the UN’s work.
The challenges facing the UN and migration stem from the erosion of multilateral cooperation (International Crisis Group 2024). In the US, migration has emerged as a key electoral theme, with citizens consistently ranking it as a top concern. With migration policy central to the election, the US-UN relationship could shift depending on its outcome. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), heavily reliant on voluntary funding, faces financial challenges due to unprecedented displacement, increasing its dependence on fundraising campaigns.
Transatlantic policymakers must collaborate to ensure that the UN can continue to protect people of concern within the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), regardless of the election’s outcome. These actors include US and EU government institutions, migration agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security and the European Union Agency for Asylum, think tanks such as the Migration Policy Institute, and NGOs.
Past and current policy approaches and post-election scenarios
The Trump administration consistently undermined multilateralism and international human rights institutions, withdrawing from key forums such as the UN Human Rights Council and pulling out of negotiations on the Global Compact for Migration (GCM) and the Global Compact for Refugees.
While overall contributions to the UN remained stable, the Trump administration sought to cut voluntary funding for several UN programmes, significantly affecting bodies such as the UNHCR (CFR.org Editors 2024). Trump’s tenure was also marked by hard-line immigration policies at home, including accelerated deportations, investment in the construction of a border wall, travel bans targeting Muslims and family separation policies aimed at deterring asylum seekers (Verea and Tigau 2022).
In contrast, the Biden administration reversed many of Trump’s immigration policies and protected long-term undocumented migrants by granting them temporary residence and shielding them from deportation (Angelos 2024; Ward and Schultheis 2024). However, by the end of 2023 with border crossings on the rise (Le Monde, 2024), Biden introduced policies that restricted the right to seek asylum (UNHCR 2024). The shift raised concerns over violations of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which guarantees the right to seek asylum (United Nations 1948).
On the international front, Biden reaffirmed the US’s commitment to multilateralism, supporting the GCM and re-joining the UN Human Rights Council (Pletka and Schaeffer 2022; US Department of State 2021). As vice president, Harris was tasked with addressing the root causes of migration from the Northern Triangle of Central America. However, her message during a visit to Guatemala in June 2021 urging migrants not to cross into the US reflected a dual approach. The Biden-Harris administration oscillated between protective measures for migrants and policies aimed at deterring migration (Blitzer 2024).
Looking ahead, if Harris wins the US election, she is expected to pursue a multilateral policy that supports funding for the UN. While this may include a focus on cooperation, it could also coincide with stricter border controls and restrictions on asylum claims. Her previous role as vice president and her involvement with the UN Commission on the Status of Women indicate a likely continuation of Biden’s engagement with the UN (Goldberg 2024).
Conversely, a Trump victory could lead to an isolationist “America First” approach with less support for the UN. His proposals on migration include a significant deportation operation and the possible end of birthright citizenship (Narea 2024). Should Trump take office, a critical consideration for the UN would be the possibility of the US withdrawing from the organisation, a notion supported by previous Republican initiatives (Rosand 2017).
While the US is a key player in shaping global migration policy, it is also important to consider the UN’s approach to migration. UN bodies such as the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly address migration-related matters through a human rights lens. Sessions of the Human Rights Council have discussed the human rights implications of migrant pushbacks, the vulnerability of migrant women and children and broader themes of migration.
As this evolving landscape within the UN unfolds, future US policy on migration will not only affect domestic and global outcomes but could also reshape multilateral cooperation, depending on whether the US continues to engage in or withdraw from these global dialogues.
Policy recommendations
If Harris wins the 2024 US elections, transatlantic policymakers should prioritise two main areas: 1) enhancing the EU-US transatlantic relationship through concrete policy coordination, such as sharing best practices, and 2) collaborating with UNHCR and IOM to reform migration systems on both sides of the Atlantic by securing more resources and humanitarian support.
First, transatlantic relations, particularly in migration policy, should be reinforced by improving coordination among established bodies. For example, in June 2021, the US and EU leaders issued a joint statement launching the US-EU Platform on Migration and Asylum (White House 2021, European Parliament 2022). The platform is intended to facilitate biannual meetings to exchange perspectives on migration and asylum policies. Years after its creation, the platform has failed to produce meaningful results. The initiative must deliver tangible results, such as the establishment of common operational guidelines that respect international refugee, human rights and humanitarian law, through increased political commitment and transparent reporting on its outcomes.
Sharing best practices or, even more critically, sharing lessons learned from unsuccessful policies should be a key focus. For example, especially since 2010, both the EU and the US have framed migration as a security threat (Rivera 2024). They have externalised their migration challenges to neighbouring countries (Mexico and Central America for the US and Turkey and North Africa for the EU) and implemented measures to prevent migrants from entering their territories (Rivera 2024). In contrast, at the UN level, discussions on migration tend to focus more on humanitarian aspects and international cooperation, avoiding the security lens that often dominates regional and national debates, particularly in the Global North.
Migration intersects with a range of complex factors, including different economic realities, climate change, disasters and persecution, all of which give rise to different types of migration flows, each with its own set of challenges. Policies must therefore address underlying structural inequalities, including neo-colonial dynamics, which often shape migration patterns and exacerbate tensions between regions. A key component of this enhanced transatlantic partnership is the development of cooperative migration policies between the Global North and South. However, this must differ from the agreement between the US and Mexico, where the number of people crossing the border fell sharply in late 2023, largely due to Mexico’s efforts to detain migrants before they reach the US (Blitzer 2024).
Second, transatlantic policymakers should work with UNHCR and IOM to expand migration systems in both the US and the EU, especially by funding humanitarian solutions. But this also includes reforming some policies, such as ending the detention of migrants, especially children, and moving away from mass deportations in favour of more humane regularisation policies.
To support these reforms, increased funding for UNHCR and IOM is essential. Both organisations have extensive global operations and regularly launch fundraising campaigns for specific projects, targeting governments, corporations and individual donors. The aim is to ensure that attention is not monopolised by high-profile humanitarian crises while protracted displacement situations are neglected.
If Trump wins the upcoming elections, transatlantic policymakers should focus on two key areas: 1) reinforcing EU regional cooperation on migration while expanding collaboration with the UN and Global South countries through UN-led initiatives; and 2) developing alternative funding mechanisms to ensure that UNHCR and IOM can continue their work even with reduced US contributions.
Given the high likelihood that international tensions could disrupt US-UN relations and based on the actions of Trump’s first administration and his campaign promises (Gowan 2017), transatlantic policymakers must prepare for limits to multilateral cooperation. This may require a shift in strategy with a greater focus placed on expanding regional alliances within the EU and increasing cooperation with Global South countries in coordination with the UN.
Policymakers must also initiate discussions on the creation of a contingency and rapid response fund within the EU specifically designed to support UNHCR and IOM in the event of reduced US contributions. This proposal could be led by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs in coordination with the Directorate-General for Budget to ensure that the necessary financial structures are in place. The European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) could also play a key role in taking this agenda forward.
For example, UNHCR has called for a significant increase in EU funding as part of the discussions on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027 (Rivera 2024). However, some EU Member States have shown reluctance, expressing interest in a more modest increase in the MFF than that proposed by the European Commission (Rivera 2024). This underlines the continuing struggle to secure greater financial commitment to ensure that UNHCR and IOM can effectively address both immediate and long-term migration challenges.
Given these financial constraints, a more feasible solution may be to integrate migration and humanitarian emergencies into the existing European Civil Protection Mechanism (ECPM). Although the ECPM is typically used for environmental emergencies, extending this mechanism to provide financial support to UN bodies such as UNHCR and IOM would allow for a coordinated and effective response to migration and humanitarian crises should US funding be reduced.
Looking beyond the 2024 elections, both the EU and the US need to take concrete steps to create a stable and resilient migration framework that can withstand political changes. To achieve financial independence for UN bodies such as UNHCR and IOM, EU Member States should diversify funding sources, for example by establishing partnerships with the private sector. In addition, cooperation with countries of the Global South should focus on equitable and sustainable partnerships that strengthen local capacities in migratory management. These actions will ensure that a more adaptable and effective migration system is in place to meet future challenges.
Note: The respective author is responsible for the content of the article. The contributions do not necessarily reflect the opinion of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.
References
Angelos, James; Ward, Myah; Schultheis, Emily (2024): Immigration fears are pushing centrists to the right in the US and Europe, Politico, www.politico.com/news/2024/06/20/centrists-immigration-policy-us-europe-00164151 (accessed on July 15, 2024).
Blitzer, Jonathan (2024): The Real Story of Kamala Harris’s Record on Immigration, The New Yorker, www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-real-story-of-kamala-harriss-record-on-immigration (accessed on August 25, 2024).
CFR.org Editors (2024): Funding the United Nations: How Much Does the U.S. Pay?, Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/article/funding-united-nations-what-impact-do-us-contributions-have-un-agencies-and-programs (accessed on August 25, 2024).
European Parliament (2022): Relaunch of the EU-US Migration Platform, www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-9-2022-000240_EN.html (accessed on August 25, 2024).
Goldberg, Mark Leon (2024): What Kamala Harris Thinks About the United Nations, UN Dispatch, undispatch.com/what-kamala-harris-thinks-about-the-united-nations/ (accessed on August 25, 2024).
Gowan, Richard (2017): Can Trump and the United Nations Just Get Along?, The Century Foundation, www.brookings.edu/articles/why-trump-needs-the-united-nations/ (accessed on August 25, 2024).
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Le Monde, (2024): Biden orders temporary Mexico border closure for asylum seekers, Le Monde, www.lemonde.fr/en/united-states/article/2024/06/04/biden-orders-temporary-mexico-border-closure-for-asylum-seekers_6673770_133.html (accessed on July 15, 2024).
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Pletka, Danielle; Schaefer, Brett D. (2022): Why Is the Biden Administration so in Love with the United Nations?, AEI, www.aei.org/op-eds/why-is-the-biden-administration-so-in-love-with-the-united-nations/ (accessed on August 25, 2024).
Rivera, Tim (2024): Building a Shared Approach to a Global Challenge: Outlining a Transatlantic Agenda for Migration, American University, www.american.edu/sis/centers/transatlantic-policy/policy-briefs/20240129-transatlantic-migration-agenda.cfm (accessed on August 25, 2024).
Rosand, Eric (2017): Why Trump needs the United Nations, Brookings, www.brookings.edu/articles/why-trump-needs-the-united-nations/ (accessed on August 25, 2024).
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UNHCR (2024): News comment: UNHCR expresses concern over new asylum restrictions in the United States, UNHCR, www.unhcr.org/news/press-releases/news-comment-unhcr-expresses-concern-over-new-asylum-restrictions-united-states (accessed on 25 August 2024).
US Department of State (2021): Revised National Statement of the United States of America on the Adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/gcm-Accessible_12212021.pdf (accessed on August 25, 2024).
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Maya Ungar is the UN Analyst at the International Crisis Group.
The impact of the United States election may be existential for the UN. The next American president and Congress will not only set policy that impacts the work of the organization, but will play a determining role in the severity of the current liquidity crisis. Regardless of who is elected, US policymakers should increase efforts to pay dues to the UN in full and on time, and the UN should consider serious reforms to its budgetary structure.
Why is the UN in a liquidity crisis?
The United Nations entered a full-blown liquidity crisis in 2024, its second in the past decade. In a January letter to member states, Secretary-General António Guterres outlined the dire situation; without immediate conservation measures, the UN was projected to run out of all cash by August. To prevent this, Guterres immediately implemented economising measures, from hiring freezes to limiting official travel.
These measures are not a sustainable solution. The core of the issue remains – member states are not paying their assessed dues in full or on time. Assessed contributions refer to the amount of money that the General Assembly determines each member state to pay; the number is determined through a complex formula measuring economic indicators such as gross national income, meaning different countries pay vastly different amounts. Despite the alarm bell letter from the Secretary-General, August ended with only 128 member states having paid dues in full – five states less than the same time last year (United Nations 2024a).
The problem is compounded by unpredictable payment patterns. Member states are obligated to pay their full financial assessments within 30 days. In 2024, only 26 per cent of member states did so (United Nations 2024a). Assessed contributions include payments to the regular budget (which finances core operational and staff costs for the Secretariat), international tribunals, the capital master plan and peacekeeping operations. When payment patterns are unpredictable, it makes it difficult for the UN to ensure the functioning of key services.
Why is the US so important to the UN budget?
The responsibility for the UN’s budget crisis should not be placed entirely on one member state, but one state in particular has a bigger impact. The United States is the biggest financial contributor to the UN, giving $18 billion to the UN in 2022 (UNCEB 2024). The US was assessed to pay $3.1 billion; the remaining $14.9 billion of US investment in the UN came from voluntary contributions.
Voluntary contributions are provided to the UN without obligation. The majority of agencies, funds and programmes – from the World Health Organisation to UN Women – are heavily reliant on voluntary contributions. These contributions are often earmarked for specific projects or priorities that align with the donor country’s interests. In 2022, the US gave over seven billion dollars to the World Food Programme alone, for example.
Despite robust voluntary contributions, the US is not paying its assessed contributions in full or on time. This is not new. The US has deferred payment of assessed contributions since the 1980s. By taking advantage of the fact that the US fiscal year begins in October while the UN fiscal year begins in January, the Reagan administration was able to meet a political commitment to save on government spending. This one-time “savings” led to a four-decade-old practice.
The US also regularly retains high arrears, or money owed, to the UN. The US currently owes $1.1 billion to the regular budget alone (Charbonneau 2024). This number is strategic; the US is careful to not allow their arrears to reach more than the contributions due for the preceding two years. Doing so would trigger Article 19 of the UN charter, resulting in the US losing its vote in the General Assembly. The US walks a thin tightrope, paying late and not in full while stopping short of accruing enough debt to face formal reprimand.
How does this impact the UN’s ability to fulfil its mandate for international peace and security?
The liquidity crisis does not mean that member states are asking less of the UN. Instead, it just results in a discrepancy between what member states mandate the UN to do, and what they end up funding. Without adequate resourcing, the UN is not able to live up to its obligations. This has a direct impact on the people the UN serves – often some of the world’s most vulnerable.
A lack of adequate funding also places undue financial burden on select member states. In peacekeeping operations, the standard practice during a financial crunch is to delay payment to the troop contributing countries (TCCs). This allows for the operation to still function, but it places the burden of financing the operation on the TCCs, who are most often developing countries. The UN does eventually reimburse the TCCs, but often has to dip into contributions collected for future budget periods to do so. This reduces future resources, and disincentives states from providing troops in the first place.
Finally, inadequate funding also threatens the legitimacy of the UN. If the UN is unable to fulfil its mandates, states will turn to other entities, but the standards and values that dictate UN operations are not always present in outside mechanisms. The use of private military companies instead of UN peacekeeping operations, for example, reduces human rights obligations for the security forces.
How will the outcome of the US elections impact UN funding?
As November creeps closer, diplomats in New York are increasingly antsy about the election’s implications for US funding to the UN. Neither candidate will solve the structural issues around US contributions, but there are particular concerns about a second Trump presidency. In his first term, Trump loudly criticized the UN, pushing back against “unfair” funding responsibilities placed on the US and reinstating a cap of 25 per cent on US commitments to the UN peacekeeping budget.
Trump also tended to use the UN as a platform to promote domestic priorities. Criticising anti-Israel bias, he withdrew from key UN institutions such as the Human Rights Council and UNESCO and defunded the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Over abortion concerns, he cut funding to the UN Populations Fund (UNFPA) – a practice started by President Reagan in 1985 and which has been put in place by every Republican president since.
UN policy in a second Trump term would likely echo many elements from his first, including defunding and withdrawing from the above-mentioned entities. He will presumably continue to promote a policy which emphasizes American sovereignty over international cooperation. The main question is whether Trump would go farther in a second term.
A plausible scenario is that Trump increases the number of entities he defunds or withdraws from, targeting bodies he has previously criticized such as the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. There would also be a more general policy shift to cut funding to the international affairs budget, something high-level Trump allies have foreshadowed (Congress 2024). Some diplomats have expressed concern that Trump will attempt to completely withdraw from or defund the UN. While not impossible, this is unlikely. The rhetoric from his allies has centred on reforming the UN to better align with American interests, rather than a complete disentanglement.
The UN would likely find a stronger ally in Kamala Harris as president, although it is difficult to predict her exact positions. Harris has rarely engaged with the UN, save for an appearance at the 2021 Commission on the Status of Women and a rare meeting with the Secretary-General. She will likely follow the main positions of the 2024 Democratic Party Platform, which calls for leveraging multilateral institutions for American interests.
In terms of UN funding, there is no indication that Harris will differ significantly from Biden. Biden tried to introduce a proposal to move forward the timing of US payments, but abandoned this priority after Congressional pushback. It is unlikely that Harris will resurrect this fight. One point of interest will be Harris’s actions regarding UNRWA. D.C. insiders have speculated that Harris would be softer on UNRWA than Biden, but even if true, it is unclear if she would be willing to use her political capital in D.C. to refund the beleaguered institution.
The bulk of attention in this election cycle is on the presidential race. Yet, the parallel Congressional races are also critical. Congress appropriates lump sums for many of the UN-related accounts, meaning the president has more agency to designate to specific agencies. However, Congress could choose to have more oversight by appropriating funding for specific UN entities. Some budget watchers in NY and D.C. are concerned that could soon be a reality as the UN has picked up steam as a partisan issue.
There is a clear partisan divide in views on the UN. Democrats typically see the value in the UN as an entity to promote American leadership and values while strengthening international cooperation. Republicans are often more pessimistic about the UN’s benefits, criticizing “mismanagement” of resources and support for abortion. This rhetoric has only strengthened since 7 October as American lawmakers – most ardently Republicans – have lobbed accusations of anti-Israel bias, even introducing legislation to cut funding to the General Assembly after a vote extending Palestine’s privileges at the UN.
What should be done?
Regardless of the results of the US elections, the UN is still in a liquidity crisis. Even though a Harris presidency would likely be better for the financial situation of the UN than a Trump presidency, it does not fundamentally change the issues around US contributions.
If Harris wins, the UN should see those four years as time to plan for how to operate with more limited US contributions in the future. If Trump wins, the UN should meet regularly with the administration to underscore the cost of American disengagement in terms of influence and power and provide clarity on elements fuelling anti-UN sentiment. In parallel to both, supportive US policymakers should continue to push for full and on-time funding to the UN, focusing on demonstrating in Congress the value of continued American involvement in the UN. Either way, the UN should attempt to diversify funding sources – courting private entities and individuals, potentially issuing bonds to meet the budget shortfall and considering implementing fees and levies to generate revenue (Chen 2024).
The US may not remain the top contributor forever. Every three years, the General Assembly reconsiders assessed contributions. Based on UN Secretariat models from June 2024, China will be set to pay around 20 per cent of the UN’s regular budget starting next year (United Nations 2024b). This number will continue to rise as China’s economy strengthens, which will likely result in increased Chinese influence at the UN through senior leadership positions and policy initiatives. Over the past few years, China has adopted the American practice of deferring payments, worsening the unpredictability issue. If nothing else, this should give the US further pause about playing games with the organisation’s financial health.
Member states should seriously consider reforms to the UN budgetary structure. In 2019, the Secretary-General provided a set of recommendations on how best to reform the system, from suspending the repayment of unspent appropriations back to member states, to increasing incentives for timely payment. These recommendations should be refreshed to reflect the current financial situation. The UN is not a perfect system by any means, but it is still a lifeline for millions of people, and member states should ensure it is adequately funded.
References
Charbonneau, Louis (2024): UN’s Financial Troubles Jeopardize Critical Human Rights Work, Human
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Junior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, India
Research question: Which UN reforms have bipartisan consensus in the US? And how can the democratic presidential administration leverage the Summit of the Future to set in motion UN and UNSC reforms that will find continuity in case of a Republican victory?
Research Assistant, European and International Politics Programme, Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung
Research question: How will a future US administration affect the evolution of UN peace operations adapting to a changing environment?
© Michael Zapf
PhD Candidate and Research Assistant, Academy for European Human Rights Protection, University of Cologne (Germany)
Research question: How can transatlantic policy-makers strengthen the UN's ability to protect migrants, depending on the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election?
© Arthur Lubig
UN Analyst at the International Crisis Group
Research question: What will the impact of the US election be on the UN's liquidity crisis, and the subsequent ability to finance peace and security operations around the world?
