Double integration?

Author: Julia Raba

How did the European unification process and German reunification interact? What role did monetary integration in particular play in this process? These and other questions were the focus of the conference "Worlds Together, Worlds Apart? Assessing the Interplay between European Integration and German Unification", which was conceived by Kiran Klaus Patel, the first Scholar-in-Residence of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung and the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, and realised with the support of the City of Hamburg. From 23 to 25 September, 21 international experts discussed these issues at the Europa-Kolleg and digitally.

In his welcoming address, Markus Kotzur, President of the Europa-Kolleg, emphasised that a European Germany and a European Europe are of great importance. After he and Meik Woyke, Chairman of the Board and Managing Director of the Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt-Stiftung, opened the conference together with Kiran Patel, the relationship between European integration and German unity was discussed in four thematic panels.

In the first panel on Germany's perspective as part of the "West", four academics presented their research findings on Germany's relationship with Great Britain, France, the United States of America and Italy. Matthias Häußler (University of Regensburg) argued that German reunification acted as a catalyst rather than a trigger for the UK's isolated position towards its EU partners. A new perspective on the UK's attitude towards Germany is that this changed after the fall of the Berlin Wall and led to a new political tactic. In contrast, the long-term dynamic between the three dominant nations in Western Europe - the UK, France and Germany - remained constant. Britain had not been able to penetrate Franco-German relations or move to a level of equality. This had already been evident since the 1960s and with regard to the close alliance between Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in the following decade. Hélène Miard-Delacroix (Sorbonne University) also analysed continuities in French and British relations with Germany and emphasised the importance of the factor of time. The re-election of the then French President François Mitterrand in 1988 and the active policy he pursued towards European integration and monetary union created a new dynamic. Miard-Delacroix also focussed in particular on France's fears regarding the political changes that German reunification would bring. non-European perspectives were also examined in the panel: What role did the United States play in the processes of European integration and German reunification? Philipp Gassert (University of Mannheim) argued that the end of the two-state system was an opportunity to reshape transatlantic relations. The "elephant in the room" of these relations was the future of NATO, which was of central importance for US security policy. For the US, the process of German reunification had to go hand in hand with further integration into NATO and an increasingly integrated European community. The US and the UK shared the desire to maintain a united Germany as a central part of the transatlantic partnership.

In the second panel, the researchers focussed on Germany as part of Eastern Central Europe. Philipp Ther (University of Vienna) argued that the history of German unity and "eastward expansion" was and is characterised by Western ideas, expectations and norms. He noted that the Berlin Wall was torn down by people on its eastern side: So had the West really "won"? Ther surmised that the West had underestimated the impact of history behind the "Iron Curtain". The term "eastward enlargement", used for example by the EU Commission and West Germany for the enlargement process with Poland, Hungary or Slovakia, was not entirely correct. These countries are part of Central Europe and their conception as part of the "East" shows the political perception of Western Europe as well as misconceptions about the role of the GDR in the "East". It was also argued that the "Eastern" nations should not be perceived as passive objects of history. Ferenc Laczo (Maastricht University) analysed various aspects of Hungary's influence on the German reunification process. Another perspective was presented by Elena Dragomir (Valahia University in Târgovişte). The so-called "Eastern Bloc" was far less monolithic than it is perceived from a Western perspective. Each nation pursued its own needs and political interests, and Romania in particular had more room for manoeuvre than the West was willing to concede. Romania's attitude towards the EEC was very accommodating, which was typical of assimilating relations between economically emerging countries and larger economic world powers. On the question of the relationship between Europe and national sovereignty, Laczo concluded that European integration was a way of gaining room for manoeuvre. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were economically strongly transnationally networked, but politically and culturally more inward-looking.

In the third panel, the European Community (EC) and German reunification were discussed with regard to monetary and economic integration. Victor Jaeschke (University of Potsdam) noted that it had been particularly important for the European Commission that economic and monetary union (EMU) was accompanied by a comprehensive European social policy. in 1990, it was believed that when the market-based Europe was nearing completion, accelerated by German reunification, the social Europe would somehow follow suit, which of course never happened, explained Jaeschke. The discussion in Germany about monetary union centred on the question: Is monetary union a loss for Germany or an advantage? The Strasbourg Summit of 1990 was one of the rare examples in which the personal influence of a political actor on a key decision in international politics could be clearly recognised. The German position and the timetable for EMU were determined personally by Helmut Kohl, who was under very strong pressure in October/November 1989. The Strasbourg summit was of great importance for Germany and Europe and there are different reports about the atmosphere at the summit. Helmut Kohl proclaimed that he had been exposed to an almost tribunal-like atmosphere, while the minutes of the summit painted a completely different picture. In general, he should not be underestimated as a tactician, said Andreas Wirsching (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich). Kohl had managed to transfer the pressure exerted on the German government from the European side after the fall of the Berlin Wall to the French government and Mitterrand, which is very clearly visible in the French archives. Harold James (Princeton University) explained that Germany's transition from the Deutschmark to the euro was accompanied by a loss of German control and made Germany dependent on the decisions of the ECB Governing Council. Another aspect was the cultural significance that the Deutschmark had for German citizens: In social narratives, the Deutschmark stood for economic and financial stability - the introduction of the euro supposedly meant a loss of precisely this. Both the European and the German monetary union were political and not economic or financial decisions, Wirsching concluded.

The topic of the last panel was European unification processes beyond the euro and their overlap with German reunification. It was German unification that led to plans for political union, which included foreign and security policy, said Gabriele Clemens (University of Hamburg). Mitterrand and Kohl aimed at strengthening the European Parliament and further institutional reforms. But who was the initiator of the idea of a common foreign and security policy for the political union? According to Clemens, there were several. In February 1990, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt proclaimed the need to build a federal union, of which foreign and security policy had to be a part. In March, the European Parliament finally called for a common foreign policy, and Jacques Delors also put forward such plans. In this context, Great Britain was against limiting its sovereignty in foreign policy, while the Netherlands and Belgium proposed closer co-operation. Germany's tactic in this matter was to allay the fears of neighbouring states. At the same time, the Germans' greatest fear was to become insignificant in the world, which was answered with a strong common security and foreign policy, said Clemens. The discussion on the podium primarily centred on issues within Germany, including political challenges in the federal states and the role of the police. Frank Bösch (University of Potsdam) emphasised how important it was to address the fear of Western nations of the spread of communist ideology through the reunification of the FRG with the GDR. Germany's Nazi past was also part of the discussion. Dominik Geppert (University of Potsdam) argued that this past was mainly brought up by the opposition in the West German parliament during the debates on German reunification. The Greens in particular expressed concern that the German reunification process could also be accompanied by a return of the "bad past". However, there was a general consensus in parliament that Germany had to learn from its past in order to have a good European future. The changes between 1985 and 1992 had been revolutionary and transformative. It was interesting that the German parliamentarians in the parliamentary debates perceived European integration as part of continuity and stability, even though it can be seen as revolutionary, said Geppert.

At the end of the conference, Kiran Patel summarised the most important findings from the panel discussions and gave an outlook on the next steps of the project. The results of the conference are to be published in an anthology.