The text by Patrick Rosenow and Kirsten Hartmann was first published on the IPG-Journal portal.

The first United Nations Peacekeeping Ministerial (PKM) will take place in Berlin from 13 to 14 May. The aim of the meeting is to discuss the future of UN peacekeeping missions. These biennial meetings are regarded as an indicator of how strong the political support for such missions still is. Of course, UN peacekeeping missions are only one tool in the UN's comprehensive "toolbox" for conflict management - alongside general conflict prevention, mediation missions and peacebuilding measures. However, the need for reform is obvious: challenges exist in the planning, implementation and conclusion of peacekeeping missions.

The last major UN peacekeeping mission was launched in 2014 with MINUSCA in the Central African Republic. Although existing missions are regularly extended, other actors such as (sub-)regional organisations in particular are becoming increasingly important. The UN missions are not achieving any major successes, while the number of conflicts is increasing worldwide. Changing conflict dynamics, for example due to new threats such as disinformation, make the work of the missions even more difficult. Nevertheless, UN peacekeeping missions are considered to be one of the most cost-efficient and effective instruments in international conflict management. They demonstrably reduce direct violence against civilian populations - and therefore remain indispensable. In view of the growing challenges, the upcoming PCM in Berlin will discuss new, more flexible models for future peacekeeping. In September 2024, the UN member states had already tasked Secretary-General António Guterres with developing reform proposals for UN peacekeeping in the Compact for the Future. So there is a lot going on in the debate about UN peacekeeping missions. And what role does Germany play in this?

Paradoxically, German troop participation has even regularly declined in those phases in which Germany was represented on the UN Security Council for two years

Most recently, the first National Security Strategy (NSS) published in 2023 emphasised that Germany wanted to assume responsibility in international crisis engagement. In practice, however, the commitment remains restrained, especially in terms of personnel. The Russian aggression against Ukraine has shifted security policy priorities towards national and alliance defence. However, a lack of substantial German involvement in UN peacekeeping would be fatal. German participation is crucial for several reasons: not only because of the need for well-trained personnel as well as logistics, transport and high-value capabilities, but also in terms of political credibility. Anyone who wants to have a say and influence in the future of peace missions must also take responsibility in terms of personnel. The final report of the Afghanistan Study Commission calls for the UN system to be strengthened through better crisis management, more funding and realistic, prioritised mandates. This can only succeed if "peace missions receive relevant material and personnel support from Germany". However, the latter has hardly been available to date. Until its withdrawal in 2023, the UN mission in Mali was Germany's last substantial - albeit selective - involvement in peacekeeping. Germany's contribution is currently largely limited to the maritime component of the UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. Although Germany has traditionally contributed reliably to the financing of UN missions, its personnel presence has always been limited - as has its political influence. Paradoxically, German troop participation even regularly declined during those phases in which Germany was represented on the UN Security Council for two years. There has long been a wide gap between aspiration and reality. This contradiction is also evident in the National Security Strategy. On the one hand, it states: "The core mission of the Bundeswehr is national and alliance defence; all tasks are subordinate to this mission." On the other hand, it states: "We will endeavour to ensure that United Nations peacekeeping missions are equipped with a clear political mandate and the necessary resources." The foreign policy message thus remains ambivalent - and points to a continuing need for clarification in the political decision-making process.

Overall, three key challenges are hampering Germany's UN involvement: firstly, the German public remains fundamentally sceptical about a stronger role in international crisis operations. Despite the mantra-like declaration of wanting to take on more responsibility, the new German government needs to communicate the meaningfulness of such missions more convincingly. Precisely because many of these missions take place far away from the reality of our own lives, there needs to be more open and at the same time comprehensible communication about the importance of multilateral action - without ignoring points of criticism. And it goes without saying that German participation must always be carefully weighed up and the prospects of success examined together with national and international partners. Secondly, the Bundeswehr remains underfunded despite the "turnaround" and the amendment to the Basic Law. A sustainable improvement requires stable funding commitments and structural reforms - including in the area of personnel. To achieve this, the defence budget must grow in the long term and structures must be adapted - also in view of the suspension of compulsory military service. A new federal government should therefore do one thing without leaving the other undone: National and alliance defence should be considered together with deployments in crisis regions. Finally, the NSS emphasises that German security is "linked to the security and stability of other regions of the world". Thirdly, there is a lack of political will and suitable structures for greater participation in the civilian sector. Although the coalition agreement of 2021 promised to strengthen crisis prevention and civilian crisis management, in practice this claim has remained largely unfulfilled. In March, for example, only twelve German police officers were deployed in UN peacekeeping missions - despite long-standing targets for expansion. In addition to differing interests between the federal and state governments, there is also a lack of career incentives for international deployments. By way of comparison, over 280 German police officers are currently deployed with Frontex - a clear indication of political priorities.

Germany must demonstrate its seriousness in UN peacekeeping when it reapplies for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2026

In view of global changes in UN peacekeeping, Germany should participate fully in the upcoming reform discussions, contribute its own proposals and, above all, provide concrete resources. The Peacekeeping Ministerial in May offers an important opportunity to make Germany's political commitment visible, to help shape the future of UN peacekeeping and to pledge binding contributions. After all, Germany must demonstrate its seriousness in UN peacekeeping when it reapplies for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2026 for the years 2027/2028 - and emphasises the strengthening of UN peacekeeping in its candidacy. However, sustainable support must not be limited to the ministerial meeting or the Security Council seat. Germany should systematically promote its involvement in the entire UN architecture for peace and security, for example within the framework of its current chairmanship of the Peacebuilding Commission or in the General Assembly, whose presidency Germany will assume in September. In principle, Germany should continue to promote the closer integration of peacebuilding and peacekeeping: politically, structurally and operationally. The ministries involved should therefore define the goals for German participation in UN-led peace operations - with binding timetables as well as personnel and financial commitments. These goals should also be coordinated with the strategic processes in NATO and the EU in order to ensure international coherence and division of labour. Such voluntary commitments can also be included in the revised crisis guidelines (originally from 2017). The new German government must act urgently - not only in view of the crisis in peacekeeping operations, but also because of the increasing cross-border security threats. In a time of multiple crises, Germany cannot afford a security policy "blueprint". Sooner or later, the effects of the current conflicts will also be felt in this country.